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INTRODUCTION

Lawyers throughout the world seek to influence law, not only through
their individual actions, but also through lawyer organizations. As interest
groups, these organizations often work to affect not only law, but also the
justice system and the workings of government. It is no secret that these
organizations sometimes try to block legal change or create new legal
rules to promote lawyers' own interests.' Lawyer organizations also work
to influence law in ways that will benefit their clients. Yet sometimes
lawyers' collective actions reflect broader political concerns rather than
their clients' or their own self-interest, such as when thousands of
Pakistani lawyers took to the streets in 2007 to protest General Pervez
Musharraf's attempt to remove the Supreme Court Chief Justice for
political reasons.2 In contrast, the German Bar Association did little to

I See, e.g., MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 5 (1988).
2

ELITE: THE

The first protests occurred in March 2007. Declan Walsh, Pakistan Lawyers Clash with

Police

over

Judge's

Sacking,

THE

GUARDIAN

(Mar.

12,

2007),

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/12/pakistan.declanwalsh. Later that year, thousands of
lawyers participated in protests organized by bar organizations around the country. Pamela Constable,
Pakistan's

Lawyers

on

the

Front

Lines,

WASH.

POST

(Nov.

19,

2007),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/18/AR2007 111801338.html,
Gardner, Pakistan Lawyers

Strike to

Protest

Musharraf Purge, REUTERS

(Dec.

Simon

5, 2007),

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-lawyers-idUSISL28295920071205; Jane Perlez & David
Rohde,

Pakistan

Attempts

to

Crush

Protest

by Lawyers,

https://www.nytimes.com/2007/1I/06/world/asia/06pakistan.html.

N.Y.

TIMES

(Nov.

6, 2007),

2019]

BEYOND THE GUILD

591

oppose Nazi efforts in 1933 to take over the bar association and to remove
Jewish judges from the judiciary. What explains attempts by lawyer
organizations to affect law? In what situations and for what reasons do
they do so?
Lawyer guilds began to appear around 1100, and like other guilds,
engaged in activities to promote their members' status and to secure a
monopoly on the work they performed.4 In Florence, a guild of judgelawyers and notaries (Arte dei Giudici e Notai) was a "vigorous
organization" by 1212." In England, lawyer societies formed in the Inns of
Court and the Inns of Chancery in the fourteenth century.6 The French
Order of Advocates was first constituted in the mid-fourteenth century. In
the early seventeenth century, French barristers acted collectively to
oppose the Crown's and high courts' efforts to tax honoraria paid to
barristers by their clients.8 By the early eighteenth century, the Order was
actively engaged in political action in opposition to both the Church and
the state. 9
Today, lawyer organizations exist in nearly every country."o

3

INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 61-62 (1992); Kenneth

F. Ledford, Lawyers and the Limits of Liberalism: The German Bar in the Weimer Republic, in
LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM
THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES 229, 230-31 (Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds.,

1997).
4
JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 365 (2008).
There were arguably guilds of law in Baghdad and elsewhere in the Muslim world even earlier. See
George Makdisi, The Guilds of Law in Medieval Legal History: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Inns

of Court, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 3,4,6 (1985).
LAURO MARTINES, LAWYERS AND STATECRAFT IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE 11, 14 (2015);
5
Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L.

REV. 1, 90 (1998).
BRUNDAGE, supra note 4, at 368; Rose, supra note 5, at 90; Introduction, INNER TEMPLE
6
LIBR., https://www.innertemplelibrary.org.uk/inner-temple/history/introduction/ (last visited Mar. 12,

2019).
7

See BRUNDAGE, supra note 4, at 368; Pierre Georges LePaulle, Law Practice in France, 50

COLUM.L.REV.945,945 (1950).
8
David A. Bell, Barristers, Politics, and the Failure of Civil Society in Old Regime France, in
LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supranote 3, at 65, 71.
Id. at 74-80; Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: A Comparative Theory
9
of Lawyers in the Making of PoliticalLiberalism, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 15, 24.

10

Lawyer organizations can be found in war-tom countries such as Syria, and in countries

operating under authoritarian rule such as China. See DAMASCAS B. ASS'N, www.damascusbar.org
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019); ZHONGGUO LOSHIWANG (I[dfiitM)[ALL CHINA LAW. ASS'NI,
http://www.acla.org.cnihome/toPage (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). Lawyer organizations can also be
found in countries with relatively few lawyers. See, e.g., Francesca Bartlett, A ProfessionalProject in
the South Pacific:Regionalism and Reforming Solomon Islands' Legal Profession,42 FORDHAM INT'L
LJ. 14, 18 (2018). The terms "lawyer organization" and "bar association" are used interchangeably in
this article.
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Comparative analysis of "lawyer" organizations is challenging, however,
because countries organize legal work quite differently." The term
"lawyer" is used in this Article to mean legally trained individuals who are
licensed to represent clients in the country's criminal courts and in most
civil court matters.1 2 So, for example, in the United States this would refer
to lawyers, in Japan to bengoshi, and in France to avocats (and not
notaires).13 Most nations have mandatory organizations to which all
lawyers must belong. Governments typically enact legislation establishing
these mandatory organizations, but then afford them some autonomy.14
This includes the right to elect leaders and to exercise some responsibility
for the regulation of lawyer conduct.' 5 In some countries, however, the
organization's leadership is essentially chosen by the state and lawyers are
constrained in their efforts to pursue collective goals through the
organization.
Many countries also have voluntary lawyer organizations to which
lawyers may choose to belong. Voluntary lawyer organizations are
typically composed of lawyers who work in the same geographic area
(e.g., the Los Angeles County Bar Association), practice setting (e.g., the
Association of Corporate Counsel), or specialty (e.g., the National

&

11 As Richard Abel noted, the concept of "lawyer" is a unitary one, based in the common law
world, with private practice at its core. However, there is no "legal profession" as such in the civil law
world, which includes other legal occupational categories such as civil servants, judges, prosecutors,
and law professors in addition to private practitioners. See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law
World, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVtL LAW WORLD 1, 4 (Richard L. Abel & Philip C. Lewis
eds., 1988). Japan has five other types of legal services providers besides attorneys (bengoshi),
including some whose work is similar to the work of U.S. lawyers (e.g., patent attorneys, tax
accountants, and judicial scriveners). See Kyoto Ishida, Ethical Standards of Japanese Lawyers:
Translation of the Ethics Codes for Six Categories of Legal Service Providers, 14 PAC. RIM L.

POL'Y 383, 383 (2005).
12 In countries like Russia and Kyrgyzstan, only criminal defense lawyers are licensed.
Unlicensed individuals can appear in a representational capacity in civil matters. See infra notes 18385 and accompanying text; Chris Johnson, Is Reform Coming to the Russian Legal Market?, AM. LAW.
(July 28,2017), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1 202793478216/.
13 We acknowledge that the definition of lawyer used here generally reflects that of common
law jurisdictions. Our analysis in this article focuses on organizations of "lawyers" as previously
defined. We exclude organizations composed exclusively of judges, pmsecutors, or other government
lawyers who, after obtaining their law degrees, are trained separately in many civil law jurisdictions
and often belong to different professional associations.
14 This approach is promoted by the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,
which state that lawyers "shall be entitled to form and join self-governing professional associations to
represent their interests." Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, art. 24, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1 (Aug.27,
1990) [hereinafter U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers].
15 This is also promoted in the U.N. Basic Principles. See id. (stating that that the executive
body of lawyers' associations "shall be elected by its members and shall exercise its functions without
external interference").
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). There are also voluntary
lawyer organizations composed of lawyers who share an affinity based,
inter alia, on gender, sexual preference, ethnicity, or religion.1 6 Voluntary
lawyer organizations are also formed so that like-minded lawyers can
pursue common political goals or human rights issues.17
International and transnational lawyer organizations, such as the
International Bar Association, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of
Europe, and the International Commission of Jurists also play a significant
role in influencing the law.' 8 These organizations work to preserve lawyer
independence, to advance their economic interests, and to support national
and local lawyer organizations. Some of these international organizations
affect law by facilitating the creation of consistent commercial practices.' 9
They often also work to devise standards concerning lawyer conduct and
consistent cross-border rules of practice. 20 These organizations further
seek to influence the law in post-conflict countries and emerging
democracies by providing technical assistance to lawyer organizations and
governments that produces new constitutions and new laws, including the
laws governing lawyers. 2
This Article examines when and why lawyer organizations seek to
influence law, either by promoting change or opposing it. The Article
compares the activities of lawyer organizations in specific countries,
noting at times how they work in conjunction with international or

&

&

16 In the United States, examples include the Women's Bar Association, the National LGBT
Bar Association, the Hispanic National Bar Association, and the Catholic Bar Association.
17 Examples include the Republican National Lawyers Association and the National Lawyers
Guild. See About the RNLA, REPUBLICAN NAT'L LAW. ASS'N, https://www.rnla.org/about-rnla/ (last
visited Mar. 12, 2019) (stating that association "builds the Republican Party goals and ideals through a
nationwide network of supportive lawyers who understand and directly support Republican policy,
agendas and candidates"); About, NAT'L LAW. GULD, https://www.nlg.org/about/ (last visited Mar.
12, 2019) (stating that its mission is to use law "as an effective force in the service of the people by
valuing human rights over property interests").
18 The International Bar Association, founded in 1947, has a membership of more than 100,000
individual lawyers and about 200 bar associations and law societies. Leslie Levin, Lynn Mather
Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, The Impact of International Lawyer Organizations on Lawyer
Regulation, 42 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 407, 413 (2018). The Council of Bars and Law Societies of
Europe, formed in 1960, represents forty-five European bars and law societies. Who We Are, CCBE,
http://www.ccbe.eu/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). The International Commission of
Jurists, formed in 1952, includes judges and lawyers from around the world. About, ICJ,
https://www.icj.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 12,2019).
19 See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in
Global Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 75, 79-80 (Terence C. Halliday

Gregory Shaffer eds. 2015).
20

See Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 409, 416-17, 423-24, 436-

21

Id.at409,429,432-33.

437.
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regional lawyer organizations. It seeks to identify the factors that enable
the organizations to act and the conditions that may prevent them from
acting, focusing not on outcomes, but on attempts to affect law. These
efforts include, for example, proposing, drafting or responding to rules or
legislation, lobbying, filing lawsuits or amicus briefs, and engaging in
strikes or other public protest. Examining the full range of lawyers'
efforts, we also include "pre-law making" activities such as problem
definition, agenda setting, and mobilization for change, as well as
implementation activities focused on enforcement or resistance. Because
of governmental impediments to action by lawyer organizations in some
jurisdictions, we also consider informal efforts by lawyers to engage in
collective actions.
Part I of this Article describes organizational theories and theories of
the legal profession that might explain why lawyer organizations attempt
to influence law. In Part II, the Article provides an overview of lawyers
and their organizations in seven countries with very different political and
legal systems. As an initial study of this issue, the small number of
countries provides an opportunity to explore the question in some depth.22
Part II briefly describes the history of lawyers and their associations in
these countries, their relationship to the courts and the state, and their view
of their role in society. Part III then examines some situations in which
lawyer organizations acted to influence law and other situations in which
they stayed silent. Using examples from the seven countries, this Part
identifies four somewhat overlapping categories in which lawyer
organizations attempted to affect the law. Part IV revisits the theoretical
perspectives to suggest when lawyer organizations will act, and when they
will not. The Article concludes by identifying questions for further
research.
I. THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONS, THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND LAWMAKING

Why might lawyer associations seek to influence law? At least two
general bodies of theory suggest some possible answers.23 First, lawyer

22 The countries were selected because of their key political and legal differences, but the small
number limits our ability to generalize about lawyer organizations in all countries. This study makes
descriptive inferences about recent attempts by lawyer organizations in those countries to influence
law based on interviews and published observations of activities in those countries. For discussion of
descriptive inferences versus causal inferences, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (2002).
23 Other possibly relevant theories include those on interest gmup advocacy, occupational
groups, and voluntary associations.
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associations are organizations, social groups designed to achieve a
common goal, and thus organizational analysis offers useful concepts and
hypotheses for explaining advocacy by organized groups. Second, theories
of the legal profession should also be considered, since lawyer
organizations-unlike other organizations such as unions or producershave their own special connection to law and the state. The general
theories of organizations are echoed in the legal profession theories.
A. OrganizationTheories
Some of the older theories of organizations provide frameworks for
understanding them at the micro level, focusing on internal characteristics
such as formal structure, management, or culture. These theories, designed
for industrial organizations, help explain why organizations making
widgets succeed or fail, but they are far less useful for explaining the
relation between organizations and the state. Moreover, their focus on
internal concerns tends to ignore how organizations operate in society as
they compete for "limited resources such as membership, capital, and
legitimacy." 24 By contrast, macro-level theories shed more light on
organization-state relations since they focus on environmental forces
influencing and constituting organizations, including their relations with
political elites and other groups.25 These theories call attention to the role
of organizations in society, the impact of the state and transnational orders
on organizations, and the benefits that organizations can obtain through
advocacy.
1. InternalAspects of Organizations
Despite the limits of micro-level organization theories for
understanding lawyer organizations and lawmaking, two internal aspects
of organizations deserve brief mention. First, the degree to which
organizations are hierarchical or participatory in their decision making
may influence their actions. Hierarchical decision-making structures allow
more freedom for leaders to follow their own instincts, personal ambitions,
or political ideologies. Participatory structures, on the other hand, may
limit leaders' decisions and actions. Even though members in participatory

24 MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY 13 (1989).
25 See, e.g., W. RICHARD SCOrr, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 114-15 (1995). On the
distinction between micro and macro-level theories of organizations, see David Lowery, Why Do
Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29, 30-31

(2007).

596

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

18:589

organizations typically pay little attention to leadership decisions (unless
on matters of direct import to them), there is always the possibility of
challenge if leaders go too far. According to Robert Michel's classic "iron
law of oligarchy," this scenario is unlikely: over time, he argues, all
complex organizations evolve into oligarchies due to bureaucracy and
specialization. 2 6 Thus, even the most democratic organizations will tend to
be controlled by a small elite.
Second, the nature of organizational membership affects the range of
actions leaders can pursue. In voluntary organizations, members who
disagree with leaders' decisions can leave and join another organization
that better represents their preferences, which may constrain leaders
concerned with retaining members. But with mandatory membership,
leaders have more freedom to act. Nevertheless, such actions must
typically relate to the work of the organization in some way and not be
overtly political lest the organization lose credibility with its members.
Trade unions or professional associations with mandatory membership
may have additional rules (either self-imposed or legally required) that
restrict organizations from lobbying on certain issues.2 7
2. Organizationsand the State
Although there is a wide range of organization theories in different
disciplines (management, sociology, political science, economics, etc.),
this section focuses on only three macro-level approaches to help
understand the relation between organizations and the state: rational actor
(utility maximizing) theory,
environmental ecology,
and new
institutionalism. Borrowing ideas from economics, rational actor theory
suggests that organizations seek to influence state policies for instrumental
reasons, typically in order to advance the interests of their members. 2 8 That
is, organizations seek to obtain benefits, secure favorable regulations,
control entry to the market or the occupation, or deter competitors. As
economist George Stigler argued, industry (or an occupation) seeks
government regulation primarily for its own benefit, not for the benefit of

26 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 61-65 (1962). But see J. Craig Jenkins, Non-Profit
Organizationsand Policy Advocacy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 296, 306
(Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (noting that the iron law of oligarchy is not ironclad where advocacy
organizations remain small, rotate leadership, and are strongly committed to participatory values).
27 See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
28 See SCOTT, supra note 25, at 27-28; Lowery, supra note 25, at 31-33.
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the general public or for purely political reasons. 2 9 Further, producer
interests are more likely to invest in political action than are consumer
interests due to producers' narrow focus on their own products or income,
in contrast to consumers' more varied areas of concern.3 0
Mancur Olson notes, however, when collective benefits become
available to all members of an organization, regardless of individual
contributions, members may rationally decide to become free riders and
take advantage of the benefits without actively contributing to them. 3 1 For
example, when management increases employee wages, they all receive
the raise whether or not they belong to the union that negotiated it. One
solution to this problem is to make organizational membership
compulsory, as in a closed union shop. In the absence of compulsory
membership, organizations offer different types of incentives to attract
individual members and avoid free riders. 32 These incentives may be
material (tangible monetary rewards or economic opportunities), solidary
(prestige, sociability, and status of belonging to the organization), or
33
purposive (benefits from identification with a common purpose or goal).
This theory suggests that professional associations either seek to make
membership mandatory or offer such incentives to overcome the collective
action problem.
Larry Ribstein poses the question: why do lawyers devote time to
lawmaking? 3 4 Not only do lawyers have an interest in the efficiency of law
and the necessary expertise to work on law, he suggests, but lawyer
associations-like other groups-can use their engagement with the state to
overcome collective action problems. That is, "[1]awyers as a group
acquire an aura of professionalism from lawmaking." 3 5 That "aura of

29

George J. Stigler, A Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SC. 3, 3, 13

(1971).
30 For empirical support for this from studies of lobbying organizations in the United States, see
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND
WHY 9 (2009); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 22 (1986). A problem with this theory, however, lies in the fact that empirical
studies have not demonstrated the effectiveness of lobbying on behalf of narrow producer interests. If
lobbying is ineffective or uncertain, why would rational actors continue with it? See Lowery, supra
note 25, at 34-35.
31 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF

GROUPS 14-16 (1965).
32
33

Id.at5l.
Peter B. Clark & James

Q.

Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations,ADMIN.

SCI. Q. 129,134-36 (1961).
34

Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers As Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV.

299,329 (2004).
35

Id.
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professionalism" provides a solidary incentive for members to identify
with bar associations. Other values promoted by their engagement with
lawmaking include professional legitimacy and credibility. For example,
when the issue of multi-disciplinary practice (MDP) arose in the United
States,36 lawyer organizations actively opposed it in part to protect their
market share, which was threatened by accounting firms. 3 Nevertheless,
other crucial intangibles influenced the organizations' positions. The
conflict over MDP involved "struggles to define the contours of
professional legitimacy - to define the social image that the legal
profession will seek to project."3 8 By opposing MDPs on grounds of legal
ethics, lawyer organizations could uphold the professional image of the
lawyer as one worthy of "professional reward and respect." 39
A second macro-theory, environmental (or population) ecology,
focuses less on the policy benefits to be gained from lobbying, and more
on organizational adaptation and survival. Groups compete with one
another in a constantly changing environment, and advocacy activity can
help organizations maintain or increase their membership. 40 Indeed,
empirical studies of why organizations lobby suggest they do so not only
to influence public policy but also to maintain the organization. 4 1 When
organizations need to secure support from allies in a coalition or thwart the
opposition, the environment in which they operate becomes crucial for
their actions. An ecological approach borrows from environmental niche
theory 42 or from Darwinian evolutionary theory 43 to emphasize an
organization's environment and its changes over time, and to explain
group activity through adaptation. Choosing when to attempt to influence
law may depend on whether government or institutions "allow or impede
access, the public opinion context in which debates takes place, and which
other organized interests are also lobbying the issue."44 Considering these

36 MDP is a partnership or other association of lawyers with nonlawyers (typically other
professionals) that has, as one of its purposes, the delivery of legal services.
37 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Confrontation between the Big Five and Big Law:
Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests for Professional Credibility, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY

615, 616 (2004).
38 Id. at 617.
39
40
41

Id.
Lowery, supra note 25, at 30-31. See also HANNAN & FREEMAN, supranote 24, at 13-15.
William P. Browne, Organizational Maintenance: The Internal Operation of Interest

Groups, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 48, 50 (1977); Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Why Do
Interest Groups Engage the Judiciary? Policy Wishes and StructuralNeeds, 87 Soc. SCI. Q. 558, 569

(2006).
42
43
44

Lowery, supra note 25, at 47-49.
HANNAN & FREEMAN, supra note 24, at 10-15.
Lowery, supra note 25, at 43.
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contextual factors-uncertain, socially determined, and not always
instrumental-David Lowery argues that the most fundamental goal of an
organization is to survive as an organization and that all other goals are
secondary.45 Organizational survival thus may help explain why and when
organized interests mobilize to seek legal change or preserve the status
quo. That is, lawyer organizations may seek to ensure the profession's
survival against threats from competitors or from the state itself.
Finally, new institutionalism offers a third perspective for
understanding organizations and the state, particularly two broad camps of
new institutionalism: historic and sociological. 46 These institutional
approaches question the assumption of rational pursuit of a group's
interests, and focus instead on the importance of historical development
and shared cultural values of groups in society. But unlike the theories
above, which consider organizations to be autonomous, historic
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism view all organizations as
deeply embedded in a larger structure. That is, "organizations are local
instantiations of wider institutions . . . [i]nstitutions, understood as takenfor-granted beliefs, rules, and norms." 47 These beliefs, rules and norms
may be regulative (such as required by law), normative (enforced by
48
shared values), or cognitive (mental models for understanding behavior).
Historical institutionalism examines how norms and values change
over time and how the past shapes the content of a group's interests and
identity. For example, lawyer associations in post-colonial countries may
relate to the state through the prism of their history with the colonial
government. This has sometimes led to lawyer organizations taking strong
positions of independence against the state. Historic institutionalism also
draws on Arthur Stinchcombe's insights about the importance of the social
and political conditions present at the time that an organization was
49
founded and how these "imprinting" effects may persist over time.

45 Id. at 46-47, 53. Lowery draws on environmental ecology and resource dependence theory to
expand on the theory of organizational survival. Id. at 47-52.
46 A third camp, rational choice, is not discussed here. Rational choice shares the assumptions
of rational actor theory, but adds an emphasis on "how structural arrangements affect the strategic
calculations of participants." Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes:
InstitutionalApproaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 6 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). For
elaboration on the three strands of new institutionalism, see id. at 5-7; Scorr, supra note 25, at 24-32;
Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalismin Political Science and Sociology, 27 COMP. POL. 231,

232-41 (1995).
47 Olivier Berthod, Institutional Theory of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,PUBLIC POLICY, AND GOVERNANCE 1 (Ali Farazmand ed., 2016).

48

Id. at2; ScoTT,supra note 25, at 33.

49
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Moreover, historical institutionalism "provides us with the notion of
'critical junctures,' key 'moments' or periods in the history of any
institution" that can explain how "organizations see, act, and think of
themselves."5 0
Sociological (or ethnographic) institutionalism focuses on how wider
cognitive and normative structures in society affect every aspect of an
organization, incorporating symbolic systems into the organization, and
constituting it through tacitly understood rules.
Whether through
affiliation with particular ideological groups, ethnic, religious, or racial
identification, or family groups, organizations may support or oppose the
state in particular ways because of their cultural context. Some of these
commonalities also become important when analyzing an organizational
sector, a group of organizations supplying a similar service or product.52
Consider, as examples, the health care sector or the software industry.
Another example is the legal sector, which may include lawyer
organizations, law firms, judges, prosecutors, and other legal officials.
Sectors possess strong social and cultural linkages, horizontally across
organizations, and vertically with respect to administrative rules and the
state. Thus, how an organization's leaders relate to and think about
government may depend in part on the institutional culture in that sector.
The state itself presents a higher-level institutional form beyond an
institutional sector, including commonly understood frameworks of
policymaking that affect how and when organizations can influence law.
States differ in how policies are made, the relation between law and
politics, and the activities considered to be government responsibilities,
rather than private responsibilities. Thus, states vary in the benefits that
can be obtained by lawyer associations through political action. The
United States also sits as an outlier, with its cultural assumptions of
liberal/individualism and strong civil society groups actively competing

ORGANIZATIONS 142, 143-44, 153-60 (James G. March ed., 1965); see also ScoTr, supra note 25, at

115.
50 Kieran McEvoy & Rachel Rebouche, Mobilizing the Professions:Lawyers, Politics, and the
Collective Legal Conscience, in JUDGES,TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275,278 (John Morison et

al. eds., 2007).
51 ScoTr, supra note 25, at 29-31.
52 W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors, in
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY 137 (John W. Meyer & W. Richard
Scott eds., 1983). See also Paul DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isonorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 64-65 (Walter W. Powell & Paul DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing
"organizational fields" as "key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and
other organizations that produce similar services or products").
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for advantage from a relatively passive state. Thus, rational actor theory
fits better at describing the proactive lobbying strategies of interest groups
in the United States than it does for organizations working within
authoritarian or corporatist states, where private individuals and groups
have less ability to influence public policies. 5 4
3. Globalization ofLaw and Organizations
In the twenty-first century, organizational theory must be expanded to
place organization-state relations within a broader global context.
Globalization has created a new legal field in which private and public
organizations exert influence and defend their turf. National professional
associations increasingly look to their own international professional
associations to influence law affecting the professions at the national and
transnational level.55 Julia Evetts shows, for example, how professional
associations in European countries (e.g., associations of engineers) have
attempted to influence EU law through several different strategies. 56
Moreover, through consultation, debate, lobbying, and networking at
international levels, international professional organizations are affecting
professional licensing, training and regulation, areas that were once the
sole purview of the nation-states.57 As James Faulconbridge and Daniel
Muzio put it, globalization has created a situation in which the national
actors formerly assumed to be powerful regulators of the professions
"have to learn to coexist with equally powerful and effective supranational
actors."5 Consequently, professional organizations may seek to influence
law at both the national and international levels.
Consider, for example, how organizations respond to a need for global
conformity to new procedures or offer solutions to global problems.

53 See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday, Legal Professions and the State: Neocorporatist Variationson
the PluralistTheme of Liberal Democracies,in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 375,
376 (1989); Ronald L. Jepperson & John W. Meyer, The Public Order and the Constructionof Formal
Organizations, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 52, at

220-25.
54 Lowery, supra note 25, at 30-31,52.
55 See Julia Evetts, InternationalProfessionalAssociations: The New Context for Professional
Projects, 9 WORK, EMP. & Soc'Y 763, 764 (1995) (noting that "international professional associations
have become more influential (more authoritative) than nation state governments, in influencing EU
directives, as well as global agreements, on professions and professional services").

56 Id. at 770.
57

Julia Evetts, Professionalism Beyond the Nation-State: InternationalSystems of Professional

Regulation in Europe, 18 INT'L J. Soc. & SOC. POL'Y 47,60 (1998).
58 James R. Faulconbridge & Daniel Muzio, Professions in a Globalizing World: Toward a
TransnationalSociology of the Professions,27 INT'L Soc. 136, 137 (2011).
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Organizations may need to work with similar groups in other countries and
also with global organizations. National actors and lawyer professional
groups, for example, created new transnational institutions for dispute
settlement in the development of international arbitration, 5 9 and have also
constructed new transnational legal categories and norms. The concept of
"international crime," for instance, emerged as a legal category through a
dialectical process in which demands from national political actors
initiated global debate that led to a new legal framework for articulating
such claims and new institutional mechanisms for adjudicating them.60
Globalization not only creates new transnational legal orders, but it
also affects the practices and values of local and national organizations in
lawmaking. Gregory Shaffer describes how intermediaries including
government representatives, professional service providers, academics,
and NGOs are the "carriers, conduits, and points of entry for the
circulation of transnational legal norms" back to the national and local
context.6 1 When this occurs, organizations may seek legal change in their
own countries to conform to transnational standards. Local and national
organizations may also engage in advocacy due to their participation in
international organizations, their collaboration with organizations from
other countries, or their receipt of financial or technical assistance from
other groups. As a result of these experiences, organizations can expand
their work into new areas, learn new methods of doing business, name
problems they had not previously diagnosed, and acquire strategies for
addressing them, all prompting them to seek changes in the law.62
B. Theories ofLegal Professions
1. Functionalism
A classic theory of the professions posits that they will use their

59 See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6-7
(1996); Florian Grisel, Competition and Cooperation in InternationalCommercial Arbitration: The
Birth ofa TransnationalLegal Profession,51 LAW & SOc'y REV. 790,794 (2017).
60 Anne Holthoefer, Constructing International Crime: Lawyers, States, and the Origin of
InternationalCriminal Prosecution in the Interwar Period,42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 711, 736, 738739 (2017) (describing legal initiatives between World War I and II that form "the legal genealogy of
the International Criminal Court").
61 Gregory Shaffer, The Dimensions and Determinants of State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 23, 41-42 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013).
62 For examples with respect to the impact of international lawyer organizations on the
regulation of the legal profession, see Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 436-

449,453-65.
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independence and expertise for the general good. 3 For Emile Durkheim
and other structural functionalists, the professions offered one antidote to
the selfish materialism otherwise found in a society composed of egoistic
individuals. 64 This structural functionalist view of the mid-twentieth
century, articulated especially by Talcott Parsons, elevated lawyers and
saw them as powerful political actors with a degree of moral superiority
who can play a major stabilizing role in society.65 According to this view,
independence permits professionals to pursue a broad, collective
orientation rather than any narrow, special interests, imbuing them with
moral superiority and legitimacy. 6 As Richard Abel notes, "if structural
functionalism had to distinguish professions by means of a single
characteristic, self-regulation would be the prime candidate." 6 7 The
arguments for professional self-regulation rest on the ideas that only
fellow professionals have the necessary expertise to judge professional
performance and on the importance of the profession's independence from
the state.6 8 Although functionalism has been largely displaced by other
theories,69 the ideology behind it resonates in lawyers' codes of conduct
and in other bar rhetoric. It may also explain the profession's attempt to
influence law to maintain self-regulation.
2. Market Control
This theory of the professions takes a rational actor perspective and
sees them as powerful groups that seek to influence law for self-interested
reasons such as maintaining their professional power and advancing their
collective social mobility. Magali Larson describes the professional
project as an effort to attain market monopoly, social status, and work
autonomy. 70 Andrew Abbott develops the concept of jurisdiction to link
professional power with expertise and market control; groups compete for

63 RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 35 (1989); John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers,
17 GA.L. REV. 891, 892 (1983).
64 ABEL, supra note 63, at 16.
65 Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 370, 378-82, 384-85 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1964); Robert K. Merton, The Functions of the
ProfessionalAssociation, 58 AM. J.NURSING 50,53 (1958).
66 Heinz, supra note 63, at 893.
67 ABEL, supra note 63, at 37.
68 Id.
69 For a critique of the usefulness of structural functionalism as an explanatory theory, see
ABEL, supra note 63, at 232-37.
70 MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 49
(1977); see also ABEL, supra note 63, at 158.

604

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

18:589

jurisdiction over areas of work and persuade governments and the public
that they have the special competence and expertise to do this work.7 1
Examples of the legal professions' attempts to exert market control
include efforts to restrict entry to the profession through overly rigorous
bar admission requirements. Lawyer organizations also seek to protect
lawyers' turf by resisting non-lawyer incursions into activities that lawyers
perform.
3. Client Interests
Lawyer organizations may also act to influence the law to benefit their
clients. Of course, such efforts can also benefit lawyers, because they can
make lawyers' work more predictable or more remunerative, and may
enhance their perceived value to their clients. It is important to note,
however, that these motivations may not be conscious, but rather due to
lawyers' "close identification with, and sharing in, [clients'] interests,"72 a
perspective that draws on sociological institutionalism. 7 3 Michael Powell
notes that "[a]lthough lawyers may leave their immediate clients at the
door of the bar association committee room, they are unable to leave
behind the common culture and values they share with clients in
general." 7 4 Likewise, when asking large firm lawyers how they would
change the law if they could do so, Robert Nelson found not much
disparity between client concerns and the lawyers' agenda for change in
the legal fields in which they actually practice."7 5 As he notes, "[s]ince
lawyers come to adopt the positions of the corporate clients whom they
represent, it is unlikely that their law reform activities will depart to any
significant extent from the positions that they advocate for their clients. "76
In some cases, however, lawyers' identification with client interests can
reduce the ability of a lawyer organization to engage in meaningful
collective action due to the diversity of clients that the organization's
membership represents.

71 ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT
LABOR 59-69, 134-142 (1988). Abbott's focus on competition among professional groups for
jurisdiction over work parallels the emphasis on organizational survival in organizational ecology
theory. Both perspectives view groups in competition for resources within a wider environment.
72 POWELL, supra note I, at 241.
73 See supra Part I.A.2.
74 POWELL, supra note 1, at 241.
75 Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practiceand Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503,525 (1985).
76 Id. at 527.
77 See POWELL, supra note 1, at 180, 220; Heinz, supra note 63, at 908; Quintin Johnstone, Bar
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4. PoliticalLiberalism
Finally, historical institutionalism has been applied to the legal
profession to explain the reasons for and nature of political advocacy by
lawyer organizations. Terence Halliday, in his study of the Chicago Bar
Association, argues that as states develop and as legal professions become
more secure vis-d-vis the state and acquire more resources, professional
78
associations engage in political activities beyond those of market control.
Instead of "a vulnerable occupation" dependent on "an empowering state"
(and thus seeking favors from the state to advance themselves), as
professions become more established they are themselves empowered and
79
the state may be weaker, facing political and structural crises. Halliday
suggests that "[t]he established legal profession, no longer absorbed with
monopoly and its maintenance," has the potential to commit its expertise
to the democratic state and to assume more responsibility for liberal
democratic government.80 At this stage, "the established profession is less
occupationally vulnerable, less reflexively self-protective and selfLawyers therefore may
preoccupied, and less collectively narcissistic.
be willing and able to contribute their expertise to a state that is
struggling.8 2 Powell notes that sometimes professions "actually precipitate
83
state action by drawing attention to areas" in which change is needed.
Why would they do this? One reason is the bar's collective value
commitments to the legitimacy of the law as an institution and to
procedural justice.84
When comparing U.S. bar activities to those in other Western
countries, Halliday and Lucian Karpik expand on these ideas to include
political activities of lawyer organizations working in opposition to the
state. They suggest how the history of the bar, the relative autonomy of
judges and courts in different countries, and the emphasis placed on

Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 193, 231-32 (1996); Jerry Van
Hoy, IntraprofessionalPolitics and ProfessionalRegulation: A CaseStudy of the ABA Commission on
Professionalism,20 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 90, 106-07 (1993).
78

TERENCE

C.

HALLIDAY,

BEYOND

MONOPOLY:

LAWYERS,

STATE

CRISES,

AND

PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 346-47 (1987).
79 Id. at 347, 353.
80 Id. at 347.
81 Id.at353.
82 Id. See also Powell's discussion of "civic professionalism" in his study of the New York City
Bar Association. POWELL, supra note 1, at 247-50.
83 POWELL, supra note 1, at 248.

84

Id. at 246,249-50.

85

Halliday & Karpik, supra note 9, at 26, 56.
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economic interests versus political goals influence the likelihood that
lawyers will engage in collective action to advance political liberalism. In
a later work, Halliday, Karpik and Malcolm Feeley examine lawyers in
countries such as Chile, China, Israel, and Japan to test "the proposition
that lawyers are active agents in the construction of liberal political
regimes."8 6 By "liberal political regimes," they mean those that embrace
individual legal freedoms with a moderate state, an independent judiciary,
and an autonomous civil society. Sometimes legal professions mobilize to
defend political liberalism, but in other situations or countries, they are
constrained from defending it or are openly hostile to it.
Scholars such as Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat have observed that
activist or "cause" lawyers are often at the forefront of efforts to promote
individual rights and liberal political regimes. 8 7 Cause lawyers are
motivated not by money or status but by an interest in social change, as
they seek to advance social justice and the interests of those without
power." Karpik discusses "political lawyers" who fight for political
liberalism but distinguishes them from "cause lawyers." 89 Regardless of
the label, these activist lawyers can sometimes move lawyer organizations
to lobby or otherwise work toward legal change.
II.

OVERVIEW OF SEVEN COUNTRIES

In view of these perspectives, when and why might we expect to see
efforts by lawyer organizations to influence the law? Even when looking
at a single country, it can be difficult to answer these questions. Crosscountry comparisons add to the complexity. The history, politics, status,
and role of lawyers in each country differ. So, too, does the composition of
lawyer organizations and the relations between the lawyer organization

86 Terence C. Halliday et al., The Legal Complex and Struggles for Political Liberalism, in
FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 1, 2 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007).
87 See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A
GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998);
THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat

& Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005).
88 In most of their work, Sarat and Scheingold restrict cause lawyering to progressive or liberal
causes, but others have suggested that concept can and should be bmadened. Thomas M. Hilbink, You
Know the Type... Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2004).
89 Lucien Karpik, Political Lawyers, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 86, at
463, 491-92 (noting that political lawyers and cause lawyers are both "committed activists," but they
differ in resources, construction of judicial issues and relations with the bar).
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and the state.
In order to consider a wide range of factors, we focus on lawyer
organizations in seven countries: Brazil, China, Israel, Japan, Kyrgyzstan,
Libya, and the United States. There are obvious limitations associated with
the country selections. For example, while we consider some civil law
countries, we have not included a European country in this analysis. One
country in Africa-Libya-is included, but it is predominantly Arab and
Berber, and therefore different than many other African countries.
Nevertheless, the countries selected are of different sizes, in different
regions, and represent different legal systems (civil, common law). They
also represent different political systems (democracies, transitional
governments, authoritarian regimes), and to some extent, different
attitudes toward the lawyer's role in civil society. The strength of the
lawyer organizations in these countries, their relationship to the state, and
their ability to mobilize also vary significantly. They do, however, share
some common features. Lawyers in all seven countries (except in some
U.S. jurisdictions) must belong to a mandatory lawyer organization. Most
of these countries also have voluntary lawyer organizations through which
lawyers seek to influence law. Some of the characteristics of the countries
and their major lawyer organizations are described below.
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OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES AND BAR ORGANIZATIONS
Population
(in
millions)-

Number
of
lawyers"

Legal
system"

Type of
government

Brazil

209.3

1.19
million

Civil law

Federal
presidential

China

1,409

365,000

Civil law

Communist

Israel

8.3

75,000

Primarily
common

Parliamentary
democracy

IBA - 1961
mandatory

6

2300

Civil
law/post
Soviet

Advokatura
2014
mandatory

Libya

6.4

4000

Civil law/
Islamic

Parliamentary
republic/postSoviet
transition
In transition

United
States

324.5

1.34
million

Common
law

Major bar
organization/
date
formed/type
OAB - 1930
mandatory

republic

ACLA - 1986
--mandatory

-

law

Kyrgyz
Republic

LBA - 1962
mandatory

law

90

Federal
constitutional
republic

ABA - 1878
voluntary (+
mandatory bar
orgs. in 32 states
& D.C.)

United Nations Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population

Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables tbl.I

(Working Paper No. ESA

P/WP/248, 2017), https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf.
91 The number of "lawyers" indicated in this column reflects the members of each lawyer
organization, except for the United States. The number of U.S. lawyers reflects the total number
licensed to practice law in all U.S. jurisdictions. The numbers reflect estimates in some cases. For the
sources consulted, listed in alphabetical order by country, see Institucional/Quadro de Advogados
[Institutional/Attorneys'

Framework],

OAB,

http://www.oab.org.br/institucionalconselhofederal/quadroadvogados

(last visited Mar. 12, 2019);

China

Has

More

Than

365,000

Lawyers,

XINHUANET

(July

2,

2018),

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/02/c_ 137296471.htm; E-mail from Amit Pearlman, Israel
Bar Ass'n, to Leslie C. Levin (Jan. 2, 2019, 03:46 EST) (on file with authors); What Is the JFBA?,
JAPAN FED'N B. Ass'Ns, https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/us/profile.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2019); Telephone Interview with Azamat Kerimbaev, ABA ROLI Country Director, Kyrgyzstan (June
20, 2017); ILAC, ILAC RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT REPORT: LIBYA 2013, at 63 (May 9, 2013),
http://www.ilacnet.org/blog/2013/05/09/ilac-assessment-report-libya-2013/;
AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA
NATIONAL
LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY:
LAWYER POPULATION
BY STATE
(2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/market-research/NationalLawyerPop
ulation-by-State_2018.authcheckdam.pdf.
92 The information in this column and the next column comes from the Central Intelligence
Agency's The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
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This section begins with countries with established democracies (the
United States, Brazil, Japan, and Israel). Even within this group, the
lawyer organizations differ greatly. The United States has no single
mandatory national lawyer organization. In Israel and the United States,
prosecutors belong to lawyer organizations, while in Brazil and Japan,
they do not. As will be seen, the lawyer organizations also have different
structures, different levels of political engagement, and different powers
and roles vis-a-vis the judiciary and the state.
The discussion then turns to countries in transition, followed by those
with autocratic regimes. Kyrgyzstan, as in other countries in Eastern
Europe and Eurasia, has some leaders working to establish a more
democratic government and judicial system after years of Soviet
domination. Libya continues to experience armed conflict, but its legal
profession has attempted to return to a more independent profession after
years of domination by Muammar Qaddafi's regime. In China, lawyers
work in an autocratic regime and are required to belong to a statecontrolled lawyer organization. Again, these lawyer organizations are
quite different from one another in their composition, histories, and ability
to seek changes in the law.
To provide an overview of the lawyer organizations in the seven
countries, this section briefly describes the country's legal system, the
history of the legal profession, and the relationship between its lawyers
and the state. It also describes the major lawyer organizations in each
country. This information provides context for the discussion in Part III.
A. Democracies
1. United States
The United States is an example of an established legal profession in a
democratic common law country. A few voluntary lawyer organizations
first appeared in colonial America in the eighteenth century,93 and others
emerged in the early-to-mid nineteenth century,94 but did not survive. In

93 From 1744-70, New York had a lawyers' association that was organized "for the purpose of
resistance to the encroachment of the British Crown in the exercise of the King's prerogative."

Marvelle Webber, Origin and Uses of Bar Associations, 7 ABA J. 297, 297 (1921). The Suffolk
County Bar Association was formed in Massachusetts in the mid-1770s. See HALLIDAY, supra note
78, at 60; Margaret H. Marshall, John Adams: Lawyer, Absentee Chief Justice, and the Author of the
Massachusetts Constitution, 10 MASS. LEGAL HIST. 27,33-34 (2004).
94 A lawyers' organization was formed in Philadelphia in 1802. Meredith Hanna, The
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the 1870s, elite bar organizations with exclusive memberships began to
appear, including the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(1870), the Chicago Bar Association (1874), and the American Bar
Association (1878).95 These exclusive organizations formed due to
concern about political and judicial corruption and a desire to improve the
standing of the legal profession. 9 6 Some voluntary lawyer associations
later emerged because the elite bar organizations would not admit certain
lawyers due to race, ethnicity, or immigrant status, or were not meeting the
needs of non-elite lawyers. 9 7
The organized bar in the United States has enjoyed a close relationship
with the courts, which assume primary responsibility for regulating
lawyers, but often delegates some of that authority to state bar
organizations. Today, U.S. lawyers must be admitted to practice in one of
the fifty states or the District of Columbia. Lawyers are required to join
their state bar organization (known as a mandatory or unified bar) in
thirty-two states and the District of Columbia." Mandatory bars include
practicing lawyers, judges, and non-practicing lawyers who wish to retain
their law licenses. In the other jurisdictions lawyers are licensed by the
state, but are not required to belong to a lawyer organization.9 9 There are
also hundreds of voluntary lawyer associations in the United States.
Lawyers, judges, and law students sometimes belong to the same
voluntary lawyer organizations. 10 0 Some of the voluntary organizations
actively engage in law reform and lobbying efforts, including the almost

Organized Bar in Philadelphia, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 301, 301 (1951); see also ROSCOE POUND, THE
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 15-16 (1953) (describing other bar associations).
95 HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 64,67.
96 See id. at 64, 67; POWELL, supra note 1, at 6, 9.
97For example, the Negro Bar Association, later known as the National Bar Association, was
incorporated in 1925 after some of its founders were denied membership in the ABA. History, NAT'L
B. ASS'N, https://www.nationalbar.org/NBA/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). See also About
NYCLA
,
N.Y.
COUNTY
LAW.
ASS'N,
http://www.nycla.org/NYCLA/About/Overview/NYCLA/About/AboutNYCLA.aspx?
(last visited
Mar. 12, 2019) (noting that the strongest factor contributing to its founding was that "the only existing
bar association in Manhattan precluded some lawyers from membership by virtue of ethnicity,
religion, gender and race").
98 See About Us, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/about the aba.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2019). The National Lawyers Guild was formed in 1937 to promote human rights and social justice.
NAT'L LAW. GUILD, https://www.nlg.org/about/history/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
99 For example, the New Jersey State Bar Association is a voluntary bar organization. See N.J.
State Bar Ass'n Bylaws, Art. IV. New Jersey lawyers are admitted to practice pursuant to a process
administered by the New Jersey Board of Bar Examiners and their annual registration is administered
by the New Jersey courts. See N.J. Rules Governing Courts 1:27-1 (2018).
100 Judges and prosecutors may also belong to their own specialty associations. The National
District Attorneys Association, the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, and the American Judges
Association are examples of such voluntary specialty organizations.
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400,000-member American Bar Association (ABA) and the National
Lawyers Guild.10 ' Other voluntary lawyer organizations focus mainly on
lawyer education, business networking, social exchange, and mutual
support.1

02

In the United States, mandatory state bar organizations often play a
major role in lawmaking on issues affecting lawyers and the
administration of justice. But their ability to act in other legal spheres has
been limited by case law and rules that prevent the expenditure of
compulsory bar dues on political activity not related to the legal
profession, administration of justice, or improving the quality of legal
services.' 03 Voluntary lawyer organizations, on the other hand, can work to
influence the law on a broader range of issues. For example, specialty bar
organizations like the American Association for Justice (the plaintiffs'
personal injury bar) engage in lobbying efforts to protect individuals'
04
rights to obtain adequate compensation in the courts.1 The ABA issues
statements and resolutions, files amicus briefs, and writes letters to
Congress and other officials on issues affecting lawyer regulation, the
substantive law, the administration of justice, and political, social, and
human rights. 0 5 The New York City Bar Association has spoken out on
matters such as the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement
06
and the use of targeted drone strikes.1
As the largest U.S. bar association, the ABA merits some additional
discussion. Although an elite organization for much of its history, it now

101 See About Us, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/about the aba.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2019). The National Lawyers Guild was formed in 1937 to promote human rights and social justice.
NAT'L LAW. GUILD, https://www.nlg.org/about/history/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
102 See, e.g., HELLENIC LAW. ASS'N, http://www.helleniclawyersassociation.org/.
103 See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (holding that attorneys who
belong to mandatory bar have First Amendment right not to pay dues that are used to subsidize the
organization's political and ideological activities); Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 32 (c) (8) (2018) (member who
objects to particular State Bar lobbying activities may request refund of portion of annual dues
allocable to those activities); Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 2-9.3(c) (2018) (same); N.H. Bar Ass'n
Const. art. I (limiting the activities of the mandatory bar "to those matters which are related directly to
the administration of justice; the composition and operation of the courts; the practice of law and the
legal profession").
104 See, e.g., Advocacy, AM. ASS'N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/membership/advocacy
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
105 See, e.g., Advocacy & Initiatives, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy.html (last

visited Mar. 12, 2019).
106 New York City Bar Association Statement on Withdrawal from Paris Climate Agreement,
N.Y.C. B (June 2, 2017), http://www.nycbar.org/media-listing/media/detaillnew-york-city-barN.Y.C. BAR, THE LEGALITY
association-statement-on-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-agreement;
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES

LAUNCHED BY THE UNITED

https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072625(2014),
D
App.
STATES,
TheLegalityofTargetedlntemationalKillingsbyUS-LaunchedDrones.pdf.
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actively seeks to attract lawyers in all substantive areas of the law and
practice settings. Its members include U.S. lawyers, law students, nonU.S. legal professionals, and non-lawyers.1 0 7 The ABA's approximately
600-member House of Delegates-which includes elected representatives
from all the state bars-has responsibility for establishing formal ABA
policy on professional and public issues.' 08 The House of Delegates elects
the officers of the ABA, including the president who serves for a one-year
term.1 09

2. Brazil
Brazil provides an example of a post-colonial legal profession in a civil
law democracy. Brazil declared its independence from Portugal in 1822.110
According to Joaquim Falcdo, "independence meant the rejection of
absolutism and the adoption of liberalism and constitutionalism-initially
monarchical and subsequently republican-as the national ideology."'''
The elite Institute of Brazilian Lawyers (IAB), founded in 1843, regularly
advised the government about legislation and helped draft the first
republican constitution.1 12 Its members' conception of professionalism
centered on "jurisprudential expertise as a specific way of influencing the
state and society." 13 The Order of Attorneys of Brazil (OAB), to which all
Brazilian lawyers (advogados) must belong, was created in 1930 by
Getulio Vargas's government.'1 4 After Vargas seized emergency power in
1937, and shut down Congress and imposed a new authoritarian
constitution, the OAB "took the lead of social and political criticism,
claiming to be a voice for public interest, in defense of the juridical order
and the rule of law."' " The OAB initially hesitated to act following the

107 Membership FAQ, A.B.A. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/membership/faq.html.
108 AM. BAR Ass'N, POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 2018-2019, at 3, 9 (2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/board of govemors/2018 2019policy
and procedureshandbook.pdf.

109 Id. at 3, 22.
110 Joaquim Falcao, Lawyers in Brazil, in LAWYERS IN SOCtETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD, supra
note 11, at 400, 400.
111 Id. at 401.
112 Maria da Gloria Bonelli, Lawyers'Associations and the Brazilian State, 1843-1997, 28 LAW
&
SOC.
INQUIRY
1045,
1052
(2003);
Historia
da
Instituigdo,
IAB,
iabnacional.org.br/institucional/historia-da-instituicao (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
113 Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1051. Nevertheless, in 1895, with the advent of the Republic, the
IAB adopted a practice of neutrality, which included not making declarations on purely political
issues. Id. at 1057.

1 14 Id. at 1045, 1048, 1059-60; Falcho, supra note I 10, at 422-23. It was only after the OAB was
formed that the practice of law was limited to those registered with the OAB. Falcho, supra, at 417.

115 Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1061.
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military coup in 1964, but a few years after the regime rewrote the
constitution and suspended Congress, the OAB and IAB began criticizing
the regime and defending human rights and the rule of law.116 The OAB
campaigned for a new constitutional convention to replace the military and
eventually became an influential lobbyist and drafter in connection with
the 1988 Constitution, which restored democracy to Brazil.1 17
At that time, lawyers were viewed as the defenders of public liberties
and human rights, and this conferred "great moral authority on OAB in the
eyes of the government and civil society."' 18 According to Maria da Gloria
Bonelli, "the defense of the juridical order has been at the core of lawyers'
collective identity, maintaining group cohesion and the public legitimacy
of the OAB."1 9 The GAB also works to protect the market for private
practitioners.1 2 0 Nevertheless, defense of the Constitution remains "a
principal ideational motivator."1 2 1
Today, the OAB consists of more than one million lawyers and law
interns. 122 It plays a central role in regulating the profession.1 2 3 The OAB
24
has twenty-seven sectional councils, one for each state or territory.1

116 MARIA HELENA MOREiRA ALVES, STATE AND OPPOSITION IN MILITARY BRAZIL 149, 157,
160-62 (1985); Eliane Botelho Junqueira, The Brazilian Bar Association in the Struggle for Human
Rights, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PRACTICE, AND

THE COMMUNITY 158, 160 (Louise G. Trubek & Jeremy Cooper eds. 1999); Bonelli, supra note 112, at
1064-65. The OAB initially expressed approval of the new regime because it felt there was a need to
establish civil order, but it subsequently shifted positions. Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1063-64.
117 MATTHEW M. TAYLOR, JUDGING POLICY: COURTS AND POLICY REFORM IN DEMOCRATIC

BRAZIL 109, 113-14 (2008).
118 Falcio, supra note I10, at 425.
119 Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1047.
120 See Junqueira, supra note 116, at 164; Fabio de Sa e Silva, Doing Well andDoing Good in an
Emerging Economy: The Social Organization ofPro Bono among CorporateLawyers and Law Firms
in Sdo Paulo, Brazil, in THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE
RISE OF THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY 210, 224 n.17
(Luciana Gross Cunha et al. eds., 2018).
121 TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 110.
million lawyers and 29,000 student intems.
122 There are approximately 1.19
Institucional/Quadrode Advogados, supra note 91. The OAB estimates that thirty percent of lawyers
do not practice law. Maria da Gloria Bonelli & Pedro Fortes, The Transformation of the Brazilian
Legal Profession: Fragmentary Development, Democratisation, and Globalisation of Lawyers in
Brazil, in LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES: NATIONAL REPORTS (Richard L. Abel & Ole
Hammerslev eds., forthcoming 2019).
123 The OAB establishes the ethical code for lawyers, administers the bar examination, and
investigates discipline complaints. Lei No. 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 5.7.94; TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 115. Nevertheless, the legal profession is not solely
controlled by the OAB. The bar exam, for example, is regularly modified in response to political
pressures, judicial challenges and legislative proposals. Bonelli & Fortes, supra note 122.
124 Frederico de Almeida & Paulo Andrd Nassar, Ordem dos Advogados do Brazil and the
Politics of ProfessionalRegulation in Brazil, in THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 120, at 181, 195.

614

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

18:589

Much of its important regulatory and political decision making occurs in
its eighty-one member Federal Council, which includes three councilors
from each of the twenty-seven states. 12 5 The Federal Council elects the
president for three-year terms. 126
The GAB directly influences law primarily through public statements
and litigation.127 It has the power under the Constitution to file challenges
to the constitutionality of actions by the federal government using the
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADINs).1 28 The IAB is small in
comparison, but it remains an active lawyer organization in some cities
and it declares itself "an intransigent defender of the democratic state of
law, national sovereignty and fundamental rights." 129 Brazil also has
specialty bar organizations, such as the Brazilian Association of Real
Estate Lawyers, the Brazilian Association of Criminal Lawyers, and
lawyers' unions.130
3. Japan
Japan is also a democracy with a civil law legal system. It was not until
the mid-1870s that the Meiji government enacted regulations that enabled
advocates (daigennin) to represent litigants in court.131 The state required
daigennin to form state-approved local organizations in an effort to control
them.1 3 2 In 1893, the Attorney Law created the profession of attorneys,

125 See TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 116; Almeida & Nassar, supra note 124, at 195; Bonelli,
supra note 112, at 1060.

126 Lei No. 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 5.7.94, art. 65;
Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1060.
127 TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 117.
128 CONSTITUicAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103 (Braz.); TAYLOR, supra note 117, at
109, 117-18. Over time, the OAB's privilege to file ADINS has been granted across most policy areas.
Taylor, supra, at 117.
129 Historiada Instituigdo, supranote 112; Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1065, 1068-69.
130 See ASSOCIAAO BRASILEIRA DE ADVOGADOS DO MERCADO IMOBILIARIO [BRAZILIAN
ASS'N OF REAL EST. LAW.], https://abami.org.br/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2019); ASSOCIAIAO
BRASILEIRA DOS ADVOGADOS CRIMINALISTAS [BRAZILIAN ASS'N OF CRIM. LAW.],
https://www.abracrim.adv.br/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2019); UNIAo BRASILEIRA DA ADVOCACIA
AMBIENTAL [BRAZILIAN UNION OF ENVTL. LAW.], https://ubaaweb.wordpress.com/ (last visited Jan.

26, 2019); Falcto, supra note 1 10, at 426-27.
131 See DARRYL E. FLAHERTY, PUBLIC LAW, PRIVATE PRACTICE: POLITICS, PROFIT, AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN 99-100 (2013); Richard W. Rabinowitz, The
HistoricalDevelopment of the JapaneseBar, 70 HARV. L. REV. 61, 64-65 (1956); What Is the JFBA?,
supra note 91. Previously, kujishi, who were proprietors of inns at which litigants lodged while
waiting for courts to hear their cases, sometimes counseled litigants, but they did not have legal
training. Rabinowitz, supra, at 62-64.
132 Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa, The State, Civil Society, and the Legal Complex in
Modern Japan: Continuity and Change, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 86, at 151,

161.
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renamed as bengoshi.1 3 3 That law also created a mandatory bar association
(bengoshikai) corresponding with the jurisdiction of each district court.1 3 4
The national government regulated the profession through World War II,
and attempted to control it with varying levels of success.' 35 In 1949, after
negotiations between bar associations and the government, a new
Practicing Attorney Act was passed.1 36 The Act created the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) for bengoshi and made the bar
associations independent from the Minister of Justice and the Supreme
Court.1

37

Feeley and Setsuo Miyazawa characterize the Japanese legal profession
as "quintessentially homo politicus."l 3 8 Notwithstanding the government's

plan to use lawyer associations to control the profession, from the outset,
"the bar was at the forefront of challenging a government not accustomed
to being openly opposed." 3 9 Indeed, the Japanese government's efforts to
restrict the profession over the years "helped define and reinforce the
profession's anti-government ethos.1 4 0 Thus, in the 1890s, the organized
bar involved itself in the formation of new political parties that challenged
the regime.141 Bar associations were organized into committees, most of
which addressed the protection of rights or the expansion of civil society
institutions.1 4 2 Opposition to the government by the mandatory Japanese
bar receded in the 1930s, when the government cracked down on
dissent.1 4 3 Yet opposition by the bar reemerged in the post-war period, as

133 Id. at 160. Today, bengoshi are one of six legal services providers in Japan and the only one
with full rights of audience in Japanese courts. See Ishida,supranote 11, at 383-85.
134 CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 2.01 [1][c](a) (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018). In
1923, the Attorney Act was revised so that lawyers could form more than one bar association in a
jurisdiction, Tokyo bar was subsequently split into three associations. Rabinowitz, supra note 131, at

72.
135 See Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 161-66.
136 U.S. occupation officials, who believed that the bar should be independent, aided efforts by
the bar associations to oppose attempts by the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice to impose
greater restrictions on lawyers. ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A
PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 108 (1976); Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 175.
137 Rabinowitz, supranote 131, at 76.
138 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 152.

139 Id. at 161.
140 Id. In addition, there is no tradition of a strong bond between the courts and the bar, and
indeed, they are often at odds. See CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.01 [1][a]; see
also Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 151 (noting that the conservative judiciary has not sought
to align itself with the bar, which has "aggressively promoted the idea of autonomous law and the
liberal state").
141 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 161.

142 Id.
143 Id. at 163.
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did its anti-government ethos. 144
Today, bengoshi are required by the Practicing Attorney Act of 1949 to
register with the JFBA and to belong to one of the fifty-two local bar
associations.145 The JFBA is composed of about 40,000 bengoshi and 410
registered foreign lawyers.146 The Act affords the JFBA significant
authority to regulate the admission and discipline of lawyers. The Act also
states in Article I that "[a] practicing attorney is entrusted with a mission
to protect fundamental human rights and to realize social justice."' 4 7
Miyazawa notes that this language expresses a "professional ideology
which reflects the prewar status of practicing attorneys," and "appears to
have actually generated tangible commitments to human rights activities
by a substantial number of lawyers." 48
The JFBA president is elected to a two-year term.1 4 9 The JFBA
sponsors nearly 100 special committees that provide networks of resources
for attorneys handling novel issues on criminal justice, human rights and
environmental issues. 1o The local bars also have authority to form
'

committees, to comment on legislation, and to speak out on issues.' 5

Other voluntary lawyer organizations active in social and political issues
include the Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom (formed in 1921),152
the Japan Young Lawyers Association (formed in 1954), and smaller
associations of activist attorneys.1 5 3 There are also a few specialty lawyer
organizations such as the Japan Labor Lawyers Association and the Japan
In-House Lawyers Association.1 54

144 Id. at 175.
145 Id.; What is the JFBA?, supra note 91.
146 What is the JFBA?, supranote 91.
147 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 175-76.
148 Setsuo Miyazawa, Lawyering for the Underrepresentedin the Context of Legal, Social, and
National Institutions: The Case of Japan, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD, supra
note 116, at 19, 21, 22; see also Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 176 (noting that this language
is more than an "empty slogan" and reaffirms the bar's "longstanding sense of responsibility, central to
its ethos").
149
Organization,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
Ass'NS,
https://www.nichibenren.orjp/en/about/us/organization.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
150 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 177.
151 See, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.01 [1][c](a); About the Tokyo
Bar, TOKYO B. ASS'N, https://www.toben.or.jp/english/about/.
152 The Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom was originally formed to organize the defense of
striking workers in the shipbuilding industry. Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 166. The Japan
Young Lawyers Association was founded to promote the new Constitution. The latter is one of only a
few organizations that include lawyers, judges, and legal academics. Id.

153 Id. at 177.
154 See LAB. LAW. ASS'N OF JAPAN, http://roudou-bengodan.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2019); JAPAN IN-HOUSE LAW. ASS'N, http://jila.jp/eng/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
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4. Israel
Another example of a democracy, Israel has a mostly common law
155
The Ottoman
legal system that derives from Ottoman and English law.
European
Islamic,
combined
1917,
until
governed
legal system, which
56
(mostly French), and Ottoman legal norms.1 During the British Mandate,
the emerging legal profession identified with the English legal system and
its ideology as a way to ground their Western identity and to distinguish
15 7
British
themselves from their Arab counterparts in the Ottoman world.
legal ideology embraced a highly individualistic and formalistic free
market philosophy.1 58 According to this view-which Jewish-Palestinian
lawyers adopted-"[tlhe lawyers' duty is to pursue their clients' interests
59
and the collective good emerges structurally from the system."I
an
After Israel declared independence in 1948, lawyers sought
autonomous bar association, but these efforts were met by suspicion in a
16 0
The Israeli
new state that prized nationalism and collectivism.
parliament eventually passed the Israel Bar Association Act of 1961,
which created the mandatory Israel Bar Association (IBA), and gave it a
61
great deal of power and autonomy to govern the legal profession.1 The
Act stressed that the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client was central, with
no suggestion that lawyers have a commitment to substantive justice or to
62
work for the public good.1
During the first twenty years after Israel declared independence,
lawyers and judges shared a strong bond because of their similar

155 Eyal Katvan et al., Lawyers in Israel: Numbers, Make-up and Modes of Practice, in
LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES: NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 122.
156 Ron Harris et al., Israeli Legal History: Past and Present, in THE HISTORY OF LAW IN A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: ISRAEL, 1917-1967, at 1, 5 (Ron Harris et al. eds., 2002); Katvan et al.,
supra note 155; Assaf Likhovski, The Time Has Not Yet Come to Repair the World in the Kingdom of
God: Israeli Lawyers and the Failed Jewish Legal Revolution of 1948, in JEWS AND THE LAW 359,
362, 363-64 (Ari Mermelstein et al. eds, 2008).
157 See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Constructing Professionalism:The ProfessionalProject of the Israeli
Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 766-67 (2001).
158 Id. at 769.
159 Id.
160 Katvan et al., supra note 155.
161 Id.; Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 766-67, 780; Neta Ziv, Combining Professionalism,Nation
Building and Public Service: The Professional Project of the Israeli Bar 1928-2002, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV 1621, 1640 (2003). The IBA's power continues to this day. As Limor Zer-Gutman notes,
"Despite the enormous changes experienced by Israeli society, its law and the legal profession in the
last half-century since regulation was instituted, no meaningful changes have taken place regarding the
Bar's status and powers." Limor Zer-Gutman, Israel: Regulation of Lawyers and Legal Services in
Israel, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND LEGAL SERVICES

139, 140 (Andrew Boon ed., 2017).
162 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1637-38, 1643-44, 1646-47.
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backgrounds and personal ties.1 63 In addition, both groups were
marginalized by the state, leading to interdependence between lawyers and
the judiciary.1 64 Until the late 1990s, the IBA mainly engaged with issues
that were directly related to lawyers or the legal system.1 6 5 At that time,
some lawyers began to dissent from the IBA's apolitical approach and
promoted the idea that the bar had a collective responsibility to promote
substantive justice.' 6 6 Since the early 2000s, when a new IBA president
entered office with a liberal agenda and demanded that the organization
take a position on human rights violations in Israel and the Occupied
Territories,1 6 7 the IBA has presented itself as having a special role and
responsibility in broader debates about public affairs. 168 In 2016, at the
IBA's suggestion, the language in the IBA Act was amended to state that
the IBA should "protect the rule of law, human rights and the basic values
of the State of Israel."' 69

Israel has more than 75,000 lawyers, making it the country with the
largest per capita number of lawyers in the world.170 The IBA is the only
bar association in Israel.171 Its president is elected to a four-year term and
serves as the chair of an elected Central Committee.1 7 2 Some Israeli
lawyers also participate in legal advocacy work through NGOs.1 73 One
such organization, Adalah, an NGO primarily composed of ArabPalestinian Israeli lawyers, advocates for non-discriminatory treatment of
Arab-Israeli citizens.1 74 Another, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel,
established in 1972, works for human rights in Israel and the Occupied

163 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 772.
164 Id. at 774-77. Rosen-Zvi explains that lawyers drew their authority as "guardians of the rule
of law"-at least in the formalistic sense -from their proximity tojudges. Id at 775.
165 See, e.g., Ziv, supra note 161, at 1625 (noting that "[i]n an era pervaded by severe human
rights violations and infringements on the rule of law, the bar maintained its 'apolitical and
independent' stance").
166 Neta Ziv, Human Rights Law and Public Interest Lawyering: A Study on the Interdependence
of Jurisprudence and the Legal Profession in Israel 82-83 (June 2001) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation,
Stanford University) (on file with authors).
167 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 142.
168 See Katvan et al., supra note 155; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 143.
169 Katvan et al., supra note 155; E-mail from Limor Zer-Gutman, Lecturer, Haim Striks School

of Law, to Leslie C. Levin (July 13, 2018, 06:40 EDT) (on file with authors).
170 See Katvan et al., supra note 155; E-mail from Amit Pearlman, supra note 91.
171 Israel's High Court of Justice has interpreted the IBA Act to mean that the IBA is meant to be
the only bar association in Israel. HCJ 2334/02 Stanger v. Chair, Knesset 58(1), 786 (2003) (Isr.).
172 The Central Committee includes the head of each of the districts in Israel. See Zer-Gutman,
supra note 161, at 148.
173 Philip W. Chung, Note, The Regulation of Israel's Legal Profession and Public Interest
Lawyering, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 659, 672 (2017).
174 Gad Barzilai, The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics, Economic
Liberalism, Silence and Dissent, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 86, at 247, 270.
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Territories.' 7 5
B. TransitionalGovernments

1. Kyrgyzstan

'

Kyrgyzstan, a country in political transition, was dominated at times by
the Mongolians, Manchurians, and Uzbeks, and became part of the
Russian empire in 1876.176 During the Soviet period, lawyers who
represented clients' private interests were members of legal collectives
administered by government agencies.177 The 1977 USSR Constitution
declared collegia of advocates to be independent of the state as "voluntary
associations of individuals who carry out advocate activity," although
oversight of the profession by state bodies and the Communist Party
continued.' 7 8 Kyrgyzstan obtained its independence from the Soviet Union
in 1991.179 The new government immediately faced the problem of
80
Following two
widespread corruption, including in the judiciary.'
the first
became
and 2010-Kyrgyzstan
revolutions-in 2005
8
parliamentary republic in central Asia.'
Today Kyrgyzstan is a Muslim majority country comprised mostly of
ethnic Kyrgyz, ethnic Uzbeks, and Russians.' 82 "Advocates" are licensed
legal services providers authorized to represent clients in criminal

175 Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski, Destruction of Houses and Constructionofa Cause: Lawyers
and Bedouins in the Israeli Courts, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 87, at 227, 235; About the Associationfor Civil Rights in
Israel, Ass'N FOR C.R. IN ISRAEL, http://www.acri.org.il/en/mission/.

176 See Robert Lowe, Nation Building and Identity in the Kyrgyz Republic, in CENTRAL ASIA:
ASPECTS OF TRANSITION 106, 107-08 (Tom Everett-Heath ed., 2003); Kyrgyzstan Profile - Timeline,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 26,2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16185772.

177 See Albert C. Malone, Jr., Soviet Bar, 46 CORNELL L. REV. 258, 258 (1961).
178 INTN'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, TOWARDS A STRONGER LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION 8-9 (2015), http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Russia-Towards-a-Stronger-

Legal-Profession-Publication-2015-Eng.pdf.
179 Lowe, supra note 176, at 106.
180 See MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT THRESHOLD
PROGRAM CONCEPT PAPER OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 1, 2 (2007); INT'L CRISIS GRP., KYRGYZSTAN:
THE CHALLENGE OF JUDICIAL REFORM 1 (2008), https://d207landvip0wj.cloudfront.net/150kyrgyzstan-the-challenge-of-judicial-reform.pdf. One poll rated the judiciary as the country's most
loathed institution. Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan: Unpopular Judiciary Difficult to Reform,
EURASIANET (Aug. 10, 2012), www.eurasianet.org/node/65246.
181 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., supra note 180, at 3-4; AM. BAR. Ass'N RULE OF LAW
INITIATIVE, LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM INDEX FOR THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 4 (2014) [hereinafter
ABA ROLl LPRI], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/kyrgyzstan/roli2
kyrgyz-republic-legal-profession-reform-index- 014.authcheckdam.pdf.

182 ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 3.
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matters.1 83 "Lawyers" are unlicensed individuals with a law diploma who
work on legal matters in government, corporations, and on their own.' 84
Individuals need no legal training in order to represent parties in civil
actions.

85

In 1999, the government passed a Law on Advocates' Activity that
protected the rights of advocates to join voluntary associations.1 8 6 Some
advocates continued to belong to collegia of advocates. The voluntary
Association of Attorneys of Kyrgyzstan (AAK), which includes a variety
of legally trained professionals, was formed in 1995 with the assistance of
the ABA's Central and Eastern Europe Law Initiative.' 8 7 The Advocates'
Union (AU), a voluntary organization composed exclusively of advocates,
was formed in 2002 due to the efforts of the Ministry of Justice.' 8 8 Two
years later, work began on a new Law of Advocacy to regulate advocates
and create a unified bar. The AAK and the AU supported these efforts
with "behind the scenes" help from the ABA Rule of Law Initiative (ABA
ROLI).' 89 Due to political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan, it was not until 2014
that the law was passed and a mandatory bar organization, the Advokatura,
was formed as an independent organization.'0 Only practicing advocates
belong to the Advokatura. Its highest governing body is the elected
Congress of Advocates, which convenes every three years. Its ninemember Board of Advocates has broad powers to ensure self-regulation of
the profession.' 9 ' Initially only a small number of advocates joined the
Advokatura, but its members now number about 2300.192

183 Id. at 6.
I 84 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 50.
187 SwIss COOPERATION OFFICE IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
DIAGNOSTIC:
MEASURING
PROGRESS
AND
IDENTIFYING
NEEDS
73
(2013),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Kyrgyzstan
JudicialSystem Diag
nostic Report.pdf; ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 50. The AAK includes advocates, lawyers,
judges, prosecutors, law teachers, and others. RUSLAN KHAKiMOV, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
KYRGYZSTAN 6-7 (2008), https://www.osce.org/odihr/363 15?download true.
188 ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 50. Only advocates belong to the Advocates Union.
SWISS COOPERATION OFFICE IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, supra note 187, at 9.
189 See AZAMAT KERIMBAEV & STEPHEN MACKENZIE, ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, SUPPORT
TO THE KYRGYZSTANI LEGAL DEFENSE COMMUNITY QUARTERLY REPORT: APRIL 1, 2013-JUNE 30,
2013, at 1 (2013), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PAOOMJJ3.pdf. The program was then known as the
ABA Central and East European Law Initiative. It later became known as ABA ROLL
190 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE BIRTH OF A NEW ADVOKATURA IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 7

(2016), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57ee88304.pdf; ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 51.
191 LAW ON ADVOCACY, arts. 4-7 (Kyrgz); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 190, at 12.
192 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 190, at 7; Telephone Interview with Azamat
Kerimbaev, supra note 91.
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2. Libya
Libya, another country in transition, was part of the Ottoman Empire
for about 350 years. Libya came under Italian rule in 1911, was ruled by
the French and the British beginning in 1943, and became independent in
195 1. 93 The national Libyan Bar Association (LBA) was established in
1962, with five regional bar associations.1 9 4 In 1969, Qaddafi led a coup
and vested his Revolutionary Command Council with legislative,
executive and judicial authority.1 95 The LBA maintained its independence
until 1981, but thereafter, legislation significantly restricted lawyers'
activities and the bar came under the control of the regime.1 96 Lawyers
were required to become state salaried as members of the Directorate of
People's Defense (subsequently known as "people's lawyers"). 19 7 Even
after the restoration of lawyers' right to engage in private practice in the
1990s,' 98 the Qaddafi government controlled the selection of bar leaders
and the manner in which lawyers could practice. 199 Lawyers advocated for
more control over bar leadership in the early 2000s, but were unsuccessful
during the Qaddafi regime.2 0 0
With the fall of Qaddafi in late 2011, the LBA and its regional bar
associations quickly became active in their own governance, electing
provisional officers in early 2012 .201 The organization had to overcome
distrust towards certain lawyers who were viewed as having colluded with
the Qadaffi regime.202 In 2014, Libya passed a new law on Law Practice
that made the LBA a mandatory lawyer organization with seven regional
associations. 20 3 The LBA does not include prosecutors, "people's
lawyers," other government lawyers, or judges; those groups fall under the
direction of the Minister of Justice.2 04

193 See ILAC, supra note 91, at 15, 17; Jessica Carlisle, Libya: Lawyers Between Ideology and
the Market, in LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES, supra note 122.
194 ILAC, supra note 91, at 61.
195 Adam Abdelmoula, Libya: The Control of Lawyers by the State, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 55, 55

(1992).
196 Carlisle, supra note 193; Abdelmoula, supra note 195, at 62-65; ILAC, supra note 91, at 23.
197 Carlisle, supra note 193.

198 Id.; Abdelmoula, supra note 195, at 73-74.
199 Carlisle, supra note 193; Abdelmoula, supra note 195, at 66-68, 73, 74.
200 See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
201 ILAC, supra note 91, at 62; Telephone Interview with Kevin George, former Country

Director, ABA ROLI Libya (May 2, 2017).
202 Telephone Interview with Kevin George, supra note 201.
203 LAW No. 3 OF 2014 ON LAW PRACTICE, arts. 7, 41 (Libya).
204 See Jessica Carlisle, Access to Justice and Legal Aid in Libya: The Future of the People's
Lawyers, in SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE IN POST-GADDAFI LIBYA 79, 82-83, 96 (Jan Michiel Otto et al.
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The new law provides for the LBA to select its own leaders and to play
an important role in the admission and discipline of lawyers. 2 05 The
General Assembly of the 4000-member LBA chooses a president and
deputy president.2 06 The Board of the LBA includes the president, the
deputy president, and seven members, each representing one of the bar's
branches.20 7 It has been difficult for the LBA to accomplish its initial
objectives-such as to draft an ethics code-due to the ongoing violence
in the country. Other lawyer organizations have also emerged, such as the
Hakki Organization (women lawyers concerned with the rights of women
and children),20 8 the Libyan Organization for Monitoring Human Rights
Violations,209 and the Libyan Lawyers' Organization, which focuses on
transitional justice and constitution building.2 10
C. AuthoritarianGovernment - China
Lawyers did not emerge as an organized profession in China until the
early twentieth century. 2 11 After the Communists took power, the
profession was purged and reconstituted according to the Soviet model
before it was essentially eliminated in the late 1950s. 2 12 After the rebirth of
the legal profession in 1979, lawyers were closely embedded in the state
bureaucracy. 213 The new legal profession in China was established by the
Interim Regulation on Lawyers, which took effect in 1982 and defined
lawyers as "state legal workers" whose work was to "serve the cause of
socialism." 2 14 Privatization of the bar began in the late 1980s and it
accelerated thereafter.2 15 The Chinese government deliberately sought to

eds., 2013). People's lawyers provide representation in criminal, civil, family and administrative
matters, but are salaried by the state. Nasser Algheitti, The Role of Criminal Defense Lawyers in the
Administration of Justice in Libya: Challenges and Prospects, in SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE IN POSTGADAFFI LIBYA, supra, at 92, 96.
205 LAW NO. 3 OF 2014 ON LAW PRACTICE, arts. 7, 13, 41, 43-45, 52-53, 55 (Libya).
206 Id. arts. 53-54.
207 Id. art. 55.
208 Promoting Change Through Women's Legal Network in Libya, ABA ROLI (Mar. 2017) (on
file with authors).
209 ILAC, supra note 91, at 65.
210 Id. at 66.
211 Sida Liu, Lawyers in Chinese Society: A Tale of Four Decades, in LAWYERS IN 21ST
CENTURY SOCIETIES, supra note 122.
212 Id.
213 Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, PoliticalEmbeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China's
Transitionfrom Socialism, 113 AM. Soc. REV. 352, 365 (2007).
214 SIDA LIU & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF
DEFENSE LAWYERS AT WORK 21 (2016).
215 Michelson, supra note 213, at 371, 372.
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rapidly expand the number of lawyers to meet the needs of economic
reform.216 Today, some elite Chinese lawyers have created mega firms
modeled after global law firms in England and the United States, including
with offices outside mainland China.217 Other legal services providers in
China, known as basic-level legal service workers, can also perform most
legal work, except criminal defense.2 18
The primary lawyer organization in China is the 340,000-member AllChina Lawyers Association (ACLA), formed in 1986, with mandatory
membership and close ties to the state. Indeed, ACLA's Charter lists
upholding Party membership as the first of its goals. 2 19 China also has
provincial and municipal lawyers' organizations, such as the Beijing
Lawyers Association (BLA). 2 20 The Communist Party maintains control of
the bar associations through provincial and local justice bureaus, which
then influence provincial and local bar associations. As Sida Liu and
Terence Halliday have noted, "Bar Association leaders are appointed from
above, not elected by lawyers, even if there is a cosmetic 'election' to
confirm appointments." 2 2 1 In the early-to-mid 2000s, the BLA had a
Committee on Constitutional Law and Human Rights, which not only
provided a platform for progressive lawyers to develop networks, but also
became involved in some rights defense cases.222 The progressive work of
the committee was effectively ended by the bar association in 2007.223
Chinese activist lawyers have also independently engaged in collective
22 4
One
action, but bar associations have rarely supported those efforts.

216 Liu, supra note 211, at 3.
217 Id. at 8-9, 17-18. Many other Chinese law firms have also expanded overseas through
international offices and referral networks, in part due to the Chinese government's "Going Out"
strategy, which encourages Chinese businesses to operate abroad. See Jing Li, All Roads Lead to
Rome: Internationalization Strategies of Chinese Law Firms 35 (Nov. 29, 2018) (unpublished),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3289037.
218 Liu, supra note 211, at 5. There are also separately licensed enterprise legal advisors in stateowned enterprises, patent agents, and trademark agents. The jurisdictional boundaries between the
legal services providers are "poorly defined" and "interprofessional competition is prevalent." Id. at 6.
219 EVA PILS, CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE 151 (2014).
220 See Independence ofLawyers: The Role ofJustice Bureaus andLawyers'Associations, HRIC
https://www.hrichina.org/en/independence-lawyers-role-justice-bureaus-and-lawyers(2013),
associations.
221 Liu & HALLIDAY, supra note 214, at 107. In addition, individuals in the government justice
bureaus sometimes serve as the general secretary of the lawyer associations. See PILS, supra note 219,

at 149, 151, 167-71.
222 Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Climbing the Weiquan Ladder: A Radicalizing Process for

Rights-Protection Lawyers, 205 CHINA Q. 40, 42 (2011); Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, The
Ecology of Activism: Professional Mobilisation
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).

in an Authoritarian

Regime 8 (Dec. 29, 2018)

223 Liu & Halliday, supra note 222, at 14.
224 For some exceptions where lawyer associations in China attempted to defend lawyers against
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such community, the "die-hard" lawyers, emerged in 2011, in part as a
response to government prosecution of lawyers who were vigorously
defending their clients. 2 25 The die-hard lawyers came from all over China
and communicated primarily through social media.22 6 In 2015, the Chinese
government initiated a large-scale crackdown on activist lawyers, with
more than two hundred questioned,
detained,
imprisoned or
"disappeared." 22 7 Some bar associations have also disciplined lawyers for
their statements against the bar association and the regime.2 28
III. FROM OCCUPATIONAL CONCERNS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: ACTIVITIES
BY LAWYER ORGANIZATIONS

How have the lawyer organizations in these seven countries tried to
affect law over the last forty years? When have they promoted legal
changes or worked to protect the legal status quo? Case studies of these
countries during this period suggest activities that fall along a continuum
from the most self-interested to the most altruistic. In some ways, as will
be discussed below, this continuum mirrors the different perspectives in
organizational theory, with activities that range from narrow professional
concerns, to those of clients, the judiciary and the administration of
justice, and to broader engagement with political issues. These four
(sometimes overlapping) categories provide a framework for our
discussion of the advocacy efforts of the lawyer associations.
A. Workingfor Issues Affecting the Legal Professionas an Occupation
Not surprisingly for an occupational interest group, lawyer
organizations often attempt to exert influence on issues that directly affect
lawyers' ability to perform and profit from their work. They seek to
define, expand or defend their monopoly on the provision of legal
services, raise their status, or improve their economic circumstances. In
order to facilitate these efforts, lawyer organizations work to attain or
preserve the right to self-regulate. They also speak out in defense of
lawyers who are threatened or prosecuted.

state action, see LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 214, at 68-70, 153-154.
225 Liu, supra note 211, at 14; Liu & Halliday, supra note 222, at 28.

226 Liu & Halliday, supra note 222, at 29.
227 Liu & HALLIDAY, supra note 214, at 165; Hualing Fu, The July 9th (709) Crackdown on
Human Rights Lawyers: Legal Advocacy in an AuthoritarianState, 27 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 554, 562

(2018).
228 Liu, supra note 211, at 15.
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1. Self-regulation
Many lawyer organizations view the right to self-regulate as necessary
for lawyers to maintain their independence from government domination,
and to protect the judicial system and defend against incursions on
individual liberties by the state.229 In the United States, the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct proclaim the importance of self-regulation
by the legal profession.2 30 U.S. bar organizations have fought for lawyers
to maintain the right to promulgate their own rules of professional conduct
without interference by Congress, federal agencies, or state legislatures.
For example, the ABA opposed efforts by Congress to impose gatekeeper
obligations on lawyers that would require them to reveal confidential
information to prevent money laundering. The ABA argued, in part, that
such legislation would undermine attorney-client privilege, confidentiality,
traditional state court regulation of the profession, and lawyer
independence. 23 1 Likewise, the California State Bar unsuccessfully fought
efforts by the state legislature to move control of the lawyer discipline
system from a lawyer-dominated process to a more independent State Bar
court.2 32
Similar attempts to preserve self-regulation of the legal profession can
be seen in Israel, where the IBA advised and lobbied against efforts to
amend the Bar Act in ways that could affect the IBA's governance and
233
power.23 For example, in 2008, the IBA successfully limited proposals to
significantly reduce the IBA's control over the lawyer discipline process
through advocacy within the Ministry of Justice and among Knesset
members.23 4 Likewise, when a public commission proposed amendments

229 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983); ABEL, supra
note 63, at 37; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 147; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers,
68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1988); Bruce Green, Lawyers' ProfessionalIndependence: Overrated or
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 602-06 (2013).
230 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [10], [11] (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
2019),
7,
(Feb.
A.B.A.
Lawyers,
on
Regulations
Gatekeeper
231
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/govemmentallegislative work/prioritiespolicy/independenc
e of the legalprofession/bank secrecy act.html.
232 RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL MISCONDUCT 21-59
(2011); William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the
CaliforniaState Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 546-63 (1995).
233 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Neta Ziv, Regulation of Israeli Lawyers, From Professional
Autonomy to Multi-Institutional Regulation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763, 1779, 1781-82, 1785-88
(2009); Yonah Jeremy Bob, Ministers to Take Up Bill to Reform Bar Association, JERUSALEM POST,

June 12, 2015.
234 Ziv, supra note 233, at 1785-88. These efforts resulted in only "minor changes" to the
existing law. Katvan et al., supra note 155.
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to the IBA Act that would reform the structure and control of the IBA, the
organization vigorously opposed those efforts. The resulting 2016
amendments largely ended up reflecting the IBA's position.23 5
In some emerging democracies with little history of lawyer selfregulation, the story is different and reflects the limits on lawyers'
independence due to their historical relationship to the state. After the fall
of the Soviet Union, the Ministry of Justice in Kyrgyzstan oversaw
regulation of the legal profession.236 Starting in 2004, activist lawyers in
Kyrgyzstan began drafting legislation providing for a self-regulatory
model of lawyer regulation with a unified, compulsory bar association.237
Some advocates opposed the creation of the compulsory Advokatura in
2014 for reasons including fear that the association would be used by
authorities to interfere with lawyer independence and suspicion of
bureaucracies.238 Indeed, five defense advocates filed a complaint with the
Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan challenging the constitutionality of the
legislation requiring lawyers to join the Advokatura, but that challenge
failed.2 39
In Libya, self-regulation by the legal profession was impossible after
Qaddafi nationalized the Libyan legal profession in 1981.240 Libyan
lawyers' collective efforts were largely aimed at obtaining some control
over their bar organizations. For example, in 2005 lawyers protested after
the Qaddafi regime appointed a leader to the Benghazi Bar Association
against the members' will, and again in early 2011, when he overstayed
his term.2 4 1 In 2010 they demonstrated for the right to form a lawyers'
union. 2 4 2 Only after Qaddafi's fall did the LBA help draft a law in 2013,
with assistance from ABA ROLI, giving them the right to hold their own
elections of bar association leaders and the right to self-regulate.243
In China, lawyer self-regulation does not operate in any meaningful

235 Katvan et al., supra note 155.
236 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 190, at 6.
237 See Telephone Interview with Azamat Kerimbaev, supra note 91.
238 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 190, at 7-8.
239 See Brief Summary of Constitutional Challenge to the Law on Advocacy and Advocate
Activities; Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic, Mar. 11,
2015 (on file with authors).
240 See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
241 ILAC, supra note 91, at 25; Ahmad Shokr, Benghazi's Lawyers, Libya's Revolutionaries,
EGYPT
INDEP. (Mar.
10, 2011), https://ww.egyptindependent.com/benghazis-lawyers-libyasrevolutionaries/.
242 LINDSEY HILSUM, SANDSTORM: LIBYA IN THE TIME OF REVOLUTION 33 (2012).
243 See LAW No. 3 OF 2014 ON LAW PRACTICE (Libya); Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen,
supra note 18, at 462, 468.
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way. ACLA operates under control of the Ministry of Justice. 2 " In 2008
some activist Chinese lawyers attempted to challenge state control over
the BLA by asking for the direct election of officers and for a decrease in
the mandatory bar fees.245 The BLA responded that the election process
was democratic and that "inflammatory" statements to the contrary
violated the law.246 After intense political conflict, the BLA made a few
symbolic concessions, including a reduction in membership fees, but at
least twenty lawyers who led the fight for change were disbarred or forced
out of their law firms. 2 4 7 Further evidence of the government's tight
control of lawyer regulation can be seen in 2016 administrative regulations
2 48
that require lawyers to establish Communist party branches in law firms.
2. ControllingSize and Quality of the Profession
As suggested by market control theory, many lawyer organizations also
seek to control admission to the bar, thereby limiting the size of the legal
profession. In the United States, at the time of the ABA's founding, it
established a Committee on Legal Education to tighten admission
requirements. 2 4 9 As Abel notes, "the battle to control supply was waged on
a number of fronts." 25 0 During the early twentieth century, the ABA
worked to persuade state licensing authorities to adopt heightened entry
requirements, including that lawyers attend law school and pass a rigorous
bar examination.25 1
In some other countries with well-established lawyer organizations, the
organizations worked aggressively to limit the number of new lawyers
admitted to practice. For example, in Japan, where the bar passage rate for
the National Bar Examination was fixed at less than three percent as late
as 1998, the JFBA strenuously opposed efforts by the Ministry of Justice
to raise the number of applicants allowed to pass the bar examination
annually.252 In 2001, the Justice System Reform Council recommended

244 LiU & HALLIDAY, supra note 214, at 21.

245 Id. at 108-111.
246 Id. at 110.
247 Id. at 110; Liu, supra note 211, at 14.
248 Measures for the Administration of Law Firms (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Sept.

6, 2016, effective Nov. 1, 2016), art. 4, CLI.4.280850(EN) (Lawinfochina).
249 ABEL, supra note 63, at 46.

250 Id. at 48.
251 Id. at 47-48, 54-57, 63.
252 Kay-Wah Chan, Setting the Limits: Who Controls the Size of the Legal Profession in Japan?,
19 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 321, 325-27 (2012); Setsuo Miyazawa, Reform in JapaneseLegal Education,
I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 89, 90-93 (2001). It was not until 2005 that more than three percent of
test-takers were allowed to pass the exam. Masayuki Murayama, Japan: Toward Stratification,
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that the pass rate be increased to 3000 examinees by 2010, but that rate has
never been reached.2 53 The JFBA has frequently advocated to limit the
number of successful bar examinees and to reduce the number of law
schools.25 4 In 2015, it succeeded in convincing the government to reduce
the annual cap on the number of lawyers who could be admitted from
2000 to 1500.255 Likewise in Israel, the IBA has warned since the 1960s
about the "overcrowding" of the profession.2 56 The IBA has both acted
unilaterally and with the assistance of the Ministry of Justice to make it
more difficult for applicants to pass the bar examination.2 57 It has also
successfully lobbied to extend the apprenticeship period, a prerequisite for
taking the bar examination. 2 5 8 In Brazil, the OAB pressed the government
to control the number of university places for law students to reduce the
number of lawyers produced.259 When that failed, the OAB made the bar
examination mandatory in 1994 to limit the number of practicing
lawyers. 2 6 0 Lawyer organizations claim that these measures help ensure
the quality of lawyers for the public's benefit, 2 6 1 but their efforts also act
as a form of market control.
Legal professions must also maintain lawyer quality and ethical
behavior so that the public holds lawyers in high esteem, trusts lawyers to

Diversification, and Specialisation, in LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES, supra note 122.
253 Murayama, supra note 252.
254 Resolution to Address Issues in Concert to Ensure the Realization of Systemic Reform in the
Fostering of Legal Professionals, JAPAN
FED'N
B.
Ass'NS
(Mar.
11,
2016),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/160311 _2.html; Chan, supra note 252, at 32931; Stacey Steele, Japan's NationalBar Exam: Results from 2015 and the Impact of the Preliminary
QualifyingExamination, 41 J. JAPAN L. 55, 60 (2016).
255 See Murayama,supra note 252.
256 Eyal Katvan, The "Overcrowding of the Profession" Argument and the Professional Melting

Pot, 19 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 301, 304 (2012).
257 See Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 151-52; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Is Bar Association Trying to
Drive Away Olim?, JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 6, 2016), http://wwwjpost.com/Israel-News/Is-BarAssociation-trying-to-drive-away-olim-440650; Evelyn Gordon, Law Students Take Bar to CourtOver
Exam, THE JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 23, 1996. In recent years, due to changes in the bar exam made
possible by an amendment to the IBA Act initiated by the IBA president, the passage rate has dropped
from 70-80% to 30%. See Limor Zer-Gutman, Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the
Legal Profession 10 (2019) [hereinafter Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal
Profession] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
258 Katvan et al., supra note 155 (discussing the IBA's "incessant preoccupation" with the length
of the apprenticeship).
259 Falcio, supra note I 10, at 424-25. More recently, the OAB has developed its own evaluation
of law schools to place pressure on the government and to restrain the proliferation of schools. Bonelli
& Fortes, supranote 122.
260 Bonelli & Fortes, supra note 122.
261 See Kay-Wah Chan, Justice System Reform and Legal Ethics in Japan, 14 LEGAL ETHICS 73,
75 (2011); Katvan, supra note 256, at 306, 309-10.
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represent them, and permits the profession to self-regulate.2 62 Lawyer
organizations therefore seek to influence the law through ethical rules and
disciplinary processes that sanction lawyers for rule violations. In the
United States, the ABA promulgates model ethical rules which state courts
largely adopt and impose on lawyers.263 The ABA has also promulgated
model rules of disciplinary enforcement for states to follow when handling
grievances against lawyers. 2 64 Likewise, lawyer organizations in Brazil,
Israel, and Japan have drafted codes of lawyer conduct and rules relating
to discipline pursuant to statutory authority.26 5 Even in countries with
fragile governments and legal systems, like Kyrgyzstan and Libya, lawyer
organizations have proposed legislation governing lawyers that contains
ethical standards and disciplinary processes.26 6 International lawyer
organizations sometimes assist national lawyer groups with these
efforts.26 7
3. Defining, Expanding andDefending the Market
In many countries, lawyer organizations have sought to influence the
law so as to define, expand, or defend their turf, that is, the territory in
which lawyers are the exclusive providers of legal services. The precise
scope of the legal professions' exclusive turf differs in every country, but
typically encompasses, at a minimum, representation of clients in courts of
general jurisdiction. 26 8 Lawyer organizations in some countries are
attempting to expand lawyers' turf or defend it from incursions by other

262 Indeed, part of the impetus for the formation of the elite U.S. lawyer organizations in the
1870s was to raise the status of the profession. See HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 64-68; POWELL, supra
note 1, at 7, 14. Organizations like the Chicago Bar Association and the New York City Bar
Association quickly turned their attention to issues like lawyer discipline in order to improve the
perception and stature of the profession. See HALLIDAY, supra, at 78; POWELL, supra, at 18-21.
263 See ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908). The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
have been adopted in some form in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Alphabetical List of

Jurisdictions

Adopting

Model

Rules,

A.B.A.

(Aug.

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model
onal conduct/alpha list state adopting model rules.html.
264 See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF'T (2002).

17,

2018),

rules of professi

265 See, e.g., Lei No. 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
5.7.94; Bengoshiho [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of June 10, 1949, art. 33 (vii)-(viii) (Japan); OAB,
C6digo de ltica e Disciplina da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil [Code of Ethics and Discipline of the
OAB] (2015), http://s.oab.org.br/PDF/CFOAB-CED.pdf (Braz.); Bar Association Rules (Professional
Ethics), 5746-1986 (Isr.); Bar Association Rules (Procedures in Disciplinary Courts), 5722-1962 (Isr.).
266 See, e.g., ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 53-54; INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note
190, at 6; Telephone Interview with Kevin George, supra note 201.
267 See Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 462-63.
268 Kyrgyz and China are exceptions because non-lawyers can represent litigants in civil court
matters.
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service providers, demonstrating rational action to advance lawyers'
interests through market control. Elsewhere the organizations are still
working to define the areas in which lawyers have the exclusive right to
practice law. Their circumstances and actions are shaped by lawyers'
history in those countries and the nature of the state.
Where legal professions have already staked out their exclusive turf,
lawyer organizations often work to preserve lawyers' monopoly over the
provision of legal services. For example in Israel, the IBA has vigorously
enforced provisions in the IBA Act that prohibit the unauthorized practice
of law to ensure lawyers remain the exclusive providers of legal
services. 2 6 9 It has brought litigation to prevent non-lawyer service
providers from assisting clients in filing claims in areas including family,
debt collection, disability and medical entitlements. 27 0 For a while, it even
resisted efforts by law school clinics to provide legal representation. 2 7 1 The
IBA has also fought the incursion of online legal services providers.27 2 In
the United States, state bar associations have challenged LegalZoom and
other online providers that compete with lawyers for work.273 In
Washington State, some bar organizations fought the creation of a new
class of legal services providers called limited license legal technicians,
who can provide legal advice in the area of family law.274 In Brazil, the
OAB fought efforts to create a separate paralegal profession, calling such
efforts "unconstitutional." 27 5 In Japan, the JFBA unsuccessfully opposed

269 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 156-57; Ziv, supra note 233, at

1776-77.
270 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 156. Likewise, the IBA
opposed reforms to streamline the collection of small judgments due to concerns that the reforms
would make parties less likely to retain lawyers' services. Yonathan A. Arbell, Adminization:
GatekeepingConsumer Contracts, 71 VAND. L. REv. 121, 174 (2014).
271 Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal Profession, supra note 257, at 20-

21.
272 Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 157.
273 See Robert Ambrogi, Latest Legal Victory Has LegalZoom Poisedfor Growth, ABA J. (Aug.

2014),
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/articlellatest legal victory has legalzoom poised for growth;
Lizzy McLellan, For Avvo, Rocket Lawyer, LegalZoom, Pa. Ethics Rules Uncertain, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(July
3,
2017),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/07/03/for-avvo-rocketlawyer-legalzoom-pa-ethics-rules-uncertain/.
274 Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule: A
National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SuPRA 75, 97, 102-110 (2013). The proposal was
opposed at various times by the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association, and by
local and specialty bar associations. Id. at 97 nn.101, 107.
275 Conselho Federalda OAB vai Contra Projeto de lei que Cria Carreirade Paralegal[OAB
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efforts by other legal services providers to change the law so that judicial
scriveners could appear in summary courts and administrative scriveners
276
could represent clients in certain administrative actions.

In some countries, lawyer organizations have not only sought to
prevent incursions by non-lawyers on their turf, but have worked to limit
the impact of global lawyer competitors. After Brazil saw an influx of
competitors from large global law firms in the 1990s, the OAB's Federal
Bar Council issued a rule in 2000 prohibiting foreign lawyers from
engaging in litigation in Brazil or advising clients on Brazilian law. 2 7 7 In
2011, it acted to further limit foreign lawyers' ability to do business by
prohibiting associations between Brazilian and foreign law firms and
punishing firms that maintained such alliances. 2 78 These debates about
regulation of foreign law firms reflected conflict over turf as well as
ideological differences over the essence of lawyering in Brazil: traditional
"public lawyering" with its constitutionally protected status vs. lawyering
as a commodity.2 79 Such internal organizational conflicts reveal
differences over values and taken-for-granted ways of viewing the world,
a central focus of new institutionalism.
Similarly, in Japan in the 1980s, the JFBA fought hard to limit
competition by foreign lawyers, and battled with the Japanese government
and the ABA concerning the right of foreign lawyers to practice in
Japan.2 80 The JFBA's continued efforts to limit competition by foreign
lawyers long prevented foreign law firms from being able to open branch
offices in Japan, even though Japanese law firms could do so. 2 8 1 Likewise

also Bonelli & Fortes, supra note 122.
276 Sayuri Umeda, Japan: Other Professionals Expand Practice Areas, Lawyers Displeased,
GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR, Sept. 17, 2014; E-mail from Kyoko Ishida, Assoc. Professor, Waseda Law
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277 See Almeida & Nassar, supranote 124, at 182, 196.

278 Id. at 197-99.
279 See Almeida & Nassar, supra note 124, at 182-83, 200-01.
280 CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.02 [3][b].
281 Allison Bettin, ForeignLawyers Fightfor Reform in Japan, JAPAN TODAY, Sept. 28, 2015. It
was not until 2014 that Japan permitted foreign law firms to open branch offices in Japan. See Gaikoku
bengoshi ni yoru hiritsu jimu no toriatsukai ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi-ho [Act on Special Measures
concerning the Handling of Legal Services by Foreign Lawyers], Law No. 69 of 2014, art. 50-2,
DS]),
[JLT
Translation
Law
(Japanese
in
translated
(Japan).
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JAPAN 4 (2011), http://gaibenkyokai.org/PositionPaperEnglish.pdf (discussing limitation on foreign
lawyers on opening more than one office in Japan). Initially, the revised rules required that the firms
employ only foreign lawyers, but foreign firms may now employ bengoshi. Bettin, supra; E-mail from
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in Israel, the 1BA unsuccessfully objected to an amendment to the IBA Act
to permit foreign lawyers to work in Israel, but it was nevertheless able to
limit the scope of foreign lawyers' permissible work and to prevent them
from forming partnerships with Israeli lawyers.2 82
In developing countries, lawyer organizations focus first on defining
lawyers' turf and protecting their economic interests. In Libya, lawyer
organizations helped draft the 2014 Law on Legal Practice, which
provides that only Libyan citizens who reside in Libya can be admitted to
appear in court. 2 83 Libyan lawyers may not use non-lawyers to assist them
in practicing law or as intermediaries. 2 84 Foreign lawyers may only appear
in court with the permission of the bar association's president, and those
lawyers must work with a Libyan lawyer. 2 8 5 The law further advances
Libyan lawyers' economic interests by requiring foreign companies to
consult with a Libyan lawyer before performing any activities in Libya.286
Although Kyrgyzstan's laws governing law practice are not as restrictive,
only citizens are permitted to become licensed advocates. 2 8 7 Currently,
individuals without legal training can represent parties in civil cases in
Kyrgyzstan, 288 but the Advokatura is exploring whether licensed advocates
should seek a monopoly over client representation in civil cases. 2 8 9
In contrast, in China, where lawyers exercise little control over the
lawyer organizations, "jurisdictional boundaries between different groups
of law practitioners are often poorly defined and interprofessional
competition is prevalent." 2 9 0 Thus, while lawyers have consolidated their
status as the primary legal profession in China, they "have not achieved
any durable monopoly." 291 The Ministry of Justice allowed foreign law
firms to establish a presence in mainland China in 1992, but they are not
permitted to handle "Chinese legal affairs" or to employ licensed Chinese
lawyers.2 92 Nevertheless, the government does not actively enforce these

282 See Katvan et al., supra note 155.
283 LAW No. 3 OF 2014 ON LAW PRACTICE, art. 4 (Libya).

284 Id. art. 35.
285 Id. art. 25.
286 Id.
287 LAW ON ADVOKATURA, art. 19 (Kyrg.). It does, however, permit others to practice in the
country subject to inter-country agreements. See How to practice in Kyrgyzstan, THE LAW Soc'Y
(June 9, 2017), http://communities.lawsociety.org.uk/international/regions/cis/kyrgyzstan/how-topractice-in-kyrgyzstan/5061925.fullarticle.

288 ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 5-6.
289 Resolution of the Second International Scientific and Practical Conference of the Advokatura
2 (2016) (on file with authors).
290 Liu, supra note 211, at 5-6.
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rules.293 In 2006, the Shanghai Lawyers Association decried rule violations
by foreign law firms-along with other alleged "illegal business
94
activities"-but the Ministry of Justice took no meaningful action. 2 The
government's inaction was likely due, in part, to concerns that limiting the
legal work of foreign law firms in China might also limit foreign
investment there.295
4. SelfDefense
In some countries, lawyer organizations seek to influence the law in
order to protect lawyers' physical safety and their ability to perform their
work without imprisonment or loss of their law licenses. They do this to
help lawyers survive individually and as a profession.2 96 For example, in
Kyrgyzstan, some advocates faced physical attacks and threats of
prosecution.29 7 In 2010, before formation of the Advokatura, a group of
161 advocates demanded that Kyrgyz authorities guarantee security in
court cases after threats and assaults on them and their clients in the
courthouse. 29 8 The 2014 Law on Advokatura, which advocate groups
helped draft, included protections for advocates when performing their
work, including from arrests.299 In 2017, the Advokatura formed a
commission that met with the Chief Prosecutor and subsequently
recommended sending a letter to the Prosecutor's Office urging that
attacks on advocates be prosecuted under the same statute covering attacks
on judges and prosecutors. 3 00 Ultimately, the letter was not sent because of
a lack of consensus within the organization, as some advocates represented
families of victims who engaged in some of the violence against the
lawyers.3 01

293 Id. at 17-18; Robert Lewis, Taxing Times, THE LAWYER, April 2, 2013.
294 Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring:InternationalandLocal Law Firms in China's
CorporateLaw Market, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 771, 772, 795 (2008).

295 Id. at 798.
296 Indeed, the United Nations Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has stated
that bar associations have a role to play in assisting lawyers who are arrested or detained. See Leandro
Despouy (Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers), Independence of Judges

and Lawyers, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. A/64/1 81 (July 28, 2009).
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299 LAW ON ADVOKATURA, art. 29 (Kyrg.).
300 Cases of the Committee on the Protection of the Professional Rights of Advocates (2017) (on
file with authors).
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Similarly, in Libya in 2011, members of the Benghazi Bar Association
participated in protests following the Qaddafi regime's arrest of lawyer
Fathi Terbil, a human rights lawyer.3 02 After the fall of the regime,
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges endured frequent threats and physical
attacks. 3 03 The LBA issued statements calling for the protection of
lawyers. 30 4 In 2015, the LBA held demonstrations at the Tripoli
courthouse to protest the assaults, arrests, and detentions of lawyers and
others associated with the legal profession.30 5 Again in 2017, the LBA held
street protests after militia kidnapped a Tripoli lawyer.306
The need to defend lawyers also arises in China, but the statecontrolled lawyer organizations rarely act to defend their members. In the
early 2000s some criminal defense lawyers were arrested or imprisoned
when acting to represent their clients. 30 7 For example, the Inner Mongolia
Lawyers Association brought close to a hundred lawyers to attend the
2003 trial of Ma Guangjun, a defense lawyer who was criminally
prosecuted for allegedly advising witnesses in his client's criminal case to
commit pejury. 30 8 Criminal defense lawyers sometimes posted comments
on the ACLA internet bulletin board to resist state power and publicize the
issues; the website enabled lawyers "to reveal problems, exchange
opinions, and promote collective ideologies." 30 9 Ultimately, however, the
ACLA forum was effectively shut down after 2007 due to the political
nature of some of the discussion.310 Thereafter, some Chinese lawyers
continued to communicate via the internet and even engaged in protest.
One instance of this collective mobilization occurred in defense of Li
Zhuang in a trial that attracted great attention. Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a
prestigious Beijing law firm, was hired to represent a client charged with
organized crime activities in Chongqing. 311 Li himself was then charged
by local authorities with violation of "Big Stick 306," essentially

302 HILSUM, supra note 242, at 8, 11-13.

303 Libya: ICC Judges Reject Sanussi Appeal, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 24, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/libya-icc-judges-reject-sanussi-appeal.
prosecutors were the victims of political assassinations in 2013. Id.
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"lawyer's perjury" committed in connection with his work.3 12 His case in
2009-2011 provided a catalyst for Chinese lawyers' frustration over the
government's abusive practice of arresting lawyers for simply defending
clients charged with crimes. Connecting through online networks such as
Weibo, scholars and "legal professionals from all over China
demonstrated an extraordinary degree of collective solidarity" in defense
3 14
of Li.3 13 Hundreds of lawyers and law students showed up at his trial.
ACLA and the local bar associations remained quiet or opposed this
informal mobilization of lawyers. 3 15 Shortly following Li's release in
2011, after four other lawyers were detained in Beihai, Guangxi Province,
under Article 306, lawyers formed a group to provide legal assistance and
called for ACLA's attention to the case. Eventually ACLA and the
Guangxi Lawyers Association expressed support for the accused
lawyers. 3 16 After the 2011 crackdown, other activist lawyers continued to
work together in a coordinated fashion through their networked, close-knit
317
community, but outside the government-controlled bar organizations.
Global organizations have supported these efforts.
B. Acting on Issues to Benefit Clients (but also Sometimes Benefitting
Lawyers)
Lawyer organizations also act to influence the law in order to benefit
clients. In doing so, they can be seen as rational actors, because these
efforts may also benefit lawyers. Benefits can include making it easier for
lawyers to predict legal outcomes, broadening the market for lawyers'
services, or preserving the attorney-client relationship. At the same time,
organizational advocacy to benefit clients may reflect the shared values of
key actors within the organization and their clients.
In countries where legal professions are relatively weak with respect to
the state, lawyer organizations may first act to influence the criminal law.
312 Id. at 44-45, 57-60. Under "Big Stick 306," defense lawyers accused of fabricating evidence
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In China, as just noted, criminal defense emerged as a crucial site for
struggle between the legal profession and the authoritarian state.
Discussions on the ACLA forum, for example, reveal the challenges
lawyer confront when representing criminal defendants.3 1 9 Activist
lawyers also mobilized as "die-hard lawyers" to protect their clients in
criminal cases. For example, in 2012, Zhou Ze organized a group of over
100 lawyers to defend 57 defendants in an organized crime case in the
Guizhou Province. 3 2 0 During the trial, die-hard lawyers wrote six open
letters to the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuracy,
the Minister of Justice, and provincial authorities in Guizhou.32 ' In 2015,
human rights lawyers representing the family of a police shooting victim
in Qingan mobilized the public and the media to hold police accountable
and to highlight abuses of police power.322 Such advocacy in the criminal
context has become less prevalent since the government's 2015 crackdown on lawyers.
Bar associations in China also occasionally attempt to influence the law
on commercial issues in ways that benefit their clients. For example, in
2004, the BLA submitted a legislative opinion-after the Legislative
Affairs Office solicited it-regarding a draft Corporation Act Amendment.
The Legislative Affairs Office ultimately adopted the legislative
suggestions from the BLA, which recommended that the initial investment
for a limited liability company (LLC) should be reduced from 100,000
RMB to 50,000 RMB.32 3 Since then, the BLA has held conferences to
discuss specific laws.324 For instance, in 2012, the BLA's Committee on
Media and Publication submitted a legislative opinion concerning the Film
Industry Promotion Law, which sought to promote industry interests under
the tax laws, lower the initial investment threshold, and otherwise help to
develop the international market.3 25 In 2013, BLA committees initiated a
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conference to prepare a legislative draft memo concerning legal regulation
of LLCs that would, among other things, save transition costs for the
companies.326

In countries with more autonomous legal professions such as the
United States, lawyer organizations often seek to influence the law to
promote their clients' interests. For example, the ABA recently opposed
provisions in the draft Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act because it
would "impose burdensome and intrusive regulations on millions of small
businesses and their lawyers." 327 When business interests pushed tort law
reform to curb personal injury and product liability litigation and cap
damages, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America vigorously
opposed it.3 2 8 This opposition from the plaintiffs' bar was designed to
protect their clients- injured plaintiffs-by preserving their opportunity for
full recovery. But preventing such reforms would also advantage the
lawyers by preserving their fees and client base. Likewise, the American
Immigration Lawyers Association has worked to increase the number of
visas available for skilled workers,329 which benefits their clients while
also providing more work for immigration lawyers. In these cases, it was
voluntary organizations that pursued these goals, rather than mandatory
state bars, which are more heterogeneous in their interests and more
constrained in their ability to act.
Lawyer organizations in other democratic countries also occasionally
act to influence the law in ways that directly benefit clients. In Israel, the
IBA threatened to take Israel's Prisons Service to court when it changed
its rules to limit defense lawyers' prison visits to clients. 3 3 0 The IBA also
opposed efforts to raise the monetary limit for small claims court, where
parties are not represented by lawyers. The IBA noted that defendants
(often their business clients) could not choose the venue for hearing the
claim and would be forced into that forum. 33 1 This change also would have

326 Beiing Lawyers Association CorporateLaw Committee Briefing, BEIJING CONTRACT L. FIRM
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://bjhtlawyer.com/lawyerRead.asp?NewslD-3555.
327 Letter from Hilarie Bass, ABA President, to Rep. Jeb Hensarling, Chair, Comm. on Financial
Servs., U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 27, 2017).
328 Clifton Barnes, Tort Reform Momentum Slowed But Not Stopped, B. LEADER 6, 6, (July-Aug.

2005).
329 Keith Donoghue, Immigration Bar Marks Its Mark on the Hill; But Did AILA Abandon
Illegals?, LEGAL TIMES, April 15, 1996; Immigration Lawyers Urge Mass Lobbying of Elected
Officials, GLOBAL ATLANTA (Sept. 16, 2000), https://www.globalatlanta.com/immigration-lawyersurge-mass-lobbying-of-elected-officials/.
330 Yonah Jeremy Bob & Ben Hartman, Limit on Prison Visits Infuriates Lawyers, JERUSALEM
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hurt Israeli lawyers by allowing more parties to litigate without them. In
Japan, the Japan Labor Lawyers Association issued a statement during the
debate over the revision of the Working Hours law, calling for changes in
the working hours system that would benefit their clients, who are
332
generally employees.
Lawyer organizations have also worked together to oppose
international regulatory efforts that could hurt their clients. For example,
bar associations, including the International Bar Association, the Council
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, the ABA, and the JFBA, negotiated
with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body
that was developing anti-money laundering standards, to resist
requirements that lawyers report their clients' suspicious financial
transactions. 33 3 Subsequently, the JFBA opposed money laundering
legislation in Japan that would require lawyers to report suspicious
financial deals that they become aware of, arguing that it would
"undermine clients' confidence in lawyers." 334 In Israel, the IBA also
vigorously opposed such gatekeeping requirements. 3 35 The OAB filed a
lawsuit after a 2012 anti-money laundering law went into effect in an
effort to exempt Brazilian attorneys from having to disclose such
information about their clients.336 In the United States, the ABA has
repeatedly opposed federal legislation that would bring lawyers under the
Bank Secrecy Act regulations or impose other disclosure requirements on
lawyers. 33 7 These efforts benefits clients-whose activities may otherwise
be reported to law enforcement authorities-and lawyers as well, who
would be forced to choose between obeying the law and preserving client
relationships. The efforts also illustrate the importance of global
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332 See The Labour Lawyers Association of Japan Issues a Statement on the Debate over
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collaboration among lawyer organizations as they develop strategies for
responding to new legal threats and initiatives.

C. Issues Directly Affecting Courts and the Administration of Justice.
Lawyer organizations also seek to improve the administration of justice
or the legitimacy of the judicial system. In some cases, lawyer
organizations take the lead or work cooperatively with courts or legislative
bodies to improve the administration of justice. They also act to protect
courts from threats to judicial independence or to the courts' legitimacy,
thereby supporting the shared values of this institutional sector. In other
cases, the organizations oppose the courts when lawyers view them as
corrupt, overreaching, or inefficient.
1. Improving and Protectingthe JudicialSystem
As Halliday and Karpik have noted, "as a political reality, bar
autonomy cannot be dealt with as a separate fact in any country" and "is
338
Thus, lawyers
linked to the relative autonomy of judges and the courts."
of the
the
independence
have a vested interest in securing or maintaining
judiciary. In some countries, lawyers also view their own standing as tied
to the legitimacy of the judicial system. In the United States, for example,
bar associations have worked to improve the courts, devoting substantial
resources to, inter alia, judicial selection, procedural rules, and court
administration. 3 3 9 They will also defend the courts against attacks on the
courts' legitimacy. This can be seen in bar organizations' responses to
President Donald Trump's attacks on judges, which appeared to be an
attempt to intimidate judges or undermine the legitimacy of their
decisions. In one such episode, then-candidate Trump claimed that a
federal judge who was hearing two cases involving Trump University was
treating him "very unfairly," and had "an absolute conflict" of interest
because of the judge's "Mexican heritage." 34 0 ABA President Paulette
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Brown swiftly responded, "levying personal criticism at an individual
judge for lawfully made decisions crosses the line of propriety and risks
undermining judicial independence." 3 4 1 In a later instance, after a federal
judge enjoined Trump's executive order banning immigrants from seven
Muslim-majority countries, Trump referred to the ruling of the "so-called
judge" as "ridiculous." 34 2 ABA President Linda Klein replied that
"personal attacks on judges are attacks on our constitution" and that "we
as lawyers are called upon to protect it." 34 3
Even in countries where judges and lawyers are not as closely aligned,
lawyer organizations sometimes take steps to defend the judicial system.
For example, in Japan, the JFBA has issued recommendations to institute
and improve a lay judge system. 34 4 It has also called for increased funding
of the judiciary.34 5 Similarly, in Brazil, the OAB has called for the hiring
of more judges to speed up the processing of cases.346 Of course, some of
these efforts to improve the courts benefit lawyers and their clients as well,
by making it easier to navigate the judicial system.
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Reform of the Saiban-in (Lay Judge) Trial System for the Post Third Year Review of the
Implementation of the Saiban-in Act, JAPAN FED'N B. ASS'NS
(Mar.
15, 2012),
https://www.nichibenren.orjp/en/document/opinionpapers/20120315 2.html.
345 JAPAN FED'N BAR ASS'NS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE POPULATION OF LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS
IN
THE
FORESEEABLE
FUTURE
9
(2009),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/en/document/data/090318.pdf.
346 See, e.g., OAB Entrega Manifesto do Advocacia Brasileira ao Presidente do Senado [OAB
Hands Over Brazilian Advocacy Manifesto to the President of the Senate], OAB (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://www.oab.org.br/noticia/55477/oab-entrega-manifesto-da-advocacia-brasileira-ao-presidente-dosenado?argumentoPesquisa-demora; Claudio Lamachia, A Hora e a Vez da Justiga [The Time and
Turn ofJustice], OAB (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.oab.org.br/noticia/54911/artigo-a-hora-e-a-vez-dajustica?argumentoPesquisa-demora.
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In countries with weaker lawyer organizations, these organizations also
sometimes work to bolster the independence and workings of the courts.
Libya's Tripoli Bar Association, in partnership with a transitional justice
program, ran the Libyan Trial Monitoring Network, which was established
in 2013 to support the right to a fair trial, promote accountability, and
assist in judicial reform.34 7 In Kyrgyzstan, the AAK worked with the
Supreme Court and NGOs to monitor and evaluate activities aimed at
increasing the independence of the judiciary and reducing rampant
corruption in the legal system.348 It is not clear, however, whether these
activities were initiated by local lawyer organizations or by other actors.349
Nevertheless, lawyer organizations do not always support the courts.
When they believe the courts are acting unfairly, exceeding their power, or
acting against lawyers' interests, the organizations may oppose them. For
example, in Japan, the Hokkaido Bar Association lodged a protest against
the Sapporo High Court for rendering decisions so quickly that it appeared
the judges were not carefully considering the cases. 35 0 Brazil's OAB has
35
sharply criticized the courts for not acting to address serious backlogs.
One OAB president criticized judges for only working on Tuesdays,
Wednesdays and Thursdays and called on them to work longer hours to
reduce the backlog.352
In Israel, the IBA's efforts to influence law with respect to the judicial
system illustrate the complicated relations of bar association leaders and
the shifting dynamics among lawyer organizations, courts, and other state
actors. The IBA is "an important venue of political struggles" and election
353
to bar leadership offers a platform for politically ambitious lawyers.

347 Supporting Libya's Democratic Transition Through Justice and Accountability, No PEACE
WITHOUT JUSTICE (2017), http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Supporting-LibyaE2%80%99s-DemocraticTransition-through-Justice-and-Accountability.html.
348 ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 53; MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., supra note 180, at
3-4.
349 For example, the U.S. State Department has funded projects to increase the quality and
efficiency of Kyrgyz's court system in collaboration with the Supreme Court of Kyrgyz, the
Association of Jurists of Kyrgyzstan, the AAK, and ABA CEEL. See MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
CORP., supra note 180, at 3-4.

350 Sapporo High Court Criticized for Speedy Decisions, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/26/national/crime-legal/sapporo-high-court-criticizedspeedy-decisions/.
351 The OAB and the Slowness of the Judiciary. "Rio Grande Needs More Judges!," APUSM, July
12, 2014; OAB Entrega Manifesto da Advocacia Brasileiraao Presidentedo Senado, supra note 346.
352 Ophir: Morosidade de Justiga Nao e Mito e se Deve a Trabalho de Juizes tqq [Ophir: The
Slowness of Justice Is Not A Myth and Is Due to Judges Working Only on Tuesday, Wednesday and
Thursday], JUSBRASIL (Feb. 4, 2010), https://oab.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/2075543/ophir-morosidadeda-justica-nao-e-mito-e-se-deve-a-trabalho-de-juizes-tqq.
353 Barzilai, supra note 174, at 264.
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IBA presidents can-and do-speak out on issues without consulting with
the larger membership, because of its hierarchical leadership structure.
After three decades of harmonious relations between bench and bar, in
1992, the IBA president accused the judiciary of corruption and claimed
that judges were appointing their close friends to administer
receiverships. 3 5 4 Then in 1996, the IBA-along with influential leadersbegan to criticize the Supreme Court's political activism under the
leadership of Chief Justice Aharon Barak. 35 5 The same IBA president
claimed that the Supreme Court had exceeded its institutional power, the
judicial system did not function properly in other respects, and it was
collapsing under its caseload.356 These attacks came shortly after the
Supreme Court issued two decisions unfavorable to the IBA's interests. 35 7
The IBA president's statements infuriated the judiciary and also created
internal rifts within the IBA. 5 Yet by 2001, a new IBA president was
defending the Supreme Court against attacks by religious members of the
Knesset who called for constitutional issues to be heard by a different
court.3 5 9 And in 2007, an IBA president called for the appointment of a
public committee to protect the independence of the judicial system.36 o
Nevertheless, in 2015, the IBA again drew the Supreme Court's ire by
publishing the results of lawyers' evaluations of judges and justices. 6 ' The
IBA president defended the survey as necessary to help improve the
judicial system, while the court claimed that the government's oversight of
the judiciary was sufficient, suggesting that the survey was carried out for
political reasons.362 According to one news report, the underlying
disagreement reflected a broader battle between the Supreme Court
president and the IBA president "over the future of the association, which
bodies of lawyers should run it, and its relations with the court."363 Yet in

354 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 760.

355
356
357
358

Ziv, supra note 233, at 1779.
Id.; Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 809-810.
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 808-8 10.
Id. at 811-12.

359 Nina Gilbert, MKs Slam "Elitist" Supreme Court in ConstitutionalParlay, JERUSALEM POST,

Aug. 29, 2001, at 5.
360 Jonathan Rosenblum, Putting the Fox in Charge,JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 24, 2007, at 8.
361 See Yonah Jeremy Bob, Bar Association Publishes 1st Survey on Judges in 10 Years,
JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Bar-Association-publishes-1stsurvey-on-judges-in-10-years-387486. From 2004-2006, the IBA had also surveyed Israeli lawyers for
the purpose of evaluating judges and justices. The Supreme Court was "infuriated" and claimed that
the bar's efforts were an "undemocratic move" intended to contravene judicial independence. See
Barzilai, supra note 174, at 266.
362 Bob, supra note 361.

363 Id.
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2017, the IBA threatened to have its members strike to show solidarity
with judges in order to obtain an increase in judges' pensions. 3 64 The
pensions depend on years of service on the bench, making judges reluctant
to retire and hindering the appointment of new judges. The IBA president
argued that, "the ones who are paying the price are the attorneys and the
litigants." 365 Thus, while the iBA's motivations for their actions were
mixed, they suggest some effort to improve the judiciary and to ensure that
it serves its proper role in a democracy.
In China, the legal profession must contend with a judiciary that is
"treated as an administrative arm of the Party-state." 3 66 Through online
discussions and organized activities, criminal defense lawyers have
expressed their grievances about specific cases and sought to hold courts
accountable. For example, as previously noted, in 2012 Zhou Ze organized
a lawyer group through the Twitter-like Weibo to travel to Guizhou
province to represent fifty-seven defendants in an organized crime case.367
Through Weibo and blogs, the group "reported on the court hearings in
real time . .. and exposed serious procedural violations by the judges and
prosecutors.36 8 In 2014, over 200 lawyers in China signed an open letter to
government authorities after a judge ordered a lawyer who was
representing a practitioner of Falun Gong to be physically removed from
the courtroom because the lawyer persisted in making a constitutional
argument in his client's defense.369
2. Access to Justice
Access to justice and primarily, access to legal representation, is
another area in which lawyer organizations seek to influence the law.
Many individuals throughout the world cannot afford a lawyer or
adequately represent their own legal interests. This undermines respect for
the courts and the administration of justice. The United Nations Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers state that "[g]overnments shall ensure
the sufficient funding and other resources for legal services to the poor,

364 Stuart Winer, Lawyers Jump into the Fray to Back Judges in Pension Feud, TIMES OF ISRAEL
https://www.timesofisrael.com/iawyers-jump-into-the-fray-to-back-judges-in2017),
29,
(Mar.
pension-feud/.

365 Id.
366 Halliday et al., supra note 86, at 20.
367 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
368 Liu & HALLIDAY, supra note 214, at 157.
369 Matthew Robertson, Chinese Lawyers Outraged as Colleague is Draggedfrom Court, EPOCH
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2014.
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and as necessary, to other disadvantaged persons." 37 0 Nevertheless, few
countries adequately fund legal aid. Lawyer organizations often advocate
for greater access to legal representation and increased funding for legal
aid.
Japan's bar has a long-standing commitment to supporting legal aid.
The JFBA and the Japan Civil Liberties Union established Japan's Legal
Aid Association in 1952, which provided civil legal aid to the indigent.37
The JFBA also advocated for the Civil Legal Aid Act in 2000, which
placed the responsibility on the government for supporting the legal aid
system. 37 2 In addition, the JFBA has advocated for increased funding and
expanded legal aid.373 The JFBA has also issued eleven "declarations on
judicial reform" since 1990 in an effort to make the justice system more
accessible to its users.374
In the United States, the ABA urged the Senate in 1974 to pass
legislation forming the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") to help fund
civil legal services for persons of limited means. 7 When President
Ronald Reagan attempted to eliminate the LSC during the 1980s, the ABA
lobbied Congress to preserve it and to resist financial cuts. 3 76 Since then,

370 U.N. Basic Principles on the Role ofLawyers, supra note 14, at art. 3.
371 CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.01 [3][f](a); Murayama, supra note 252.
372 Murayama, supra note 252; LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, PRO BONO PRACTICES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
IN
JAPAN
3
(2010),
https://www.1w.com/admin/Upload/Documents/Global%20Pro%2Bono%2OSurvey/pro-bono-in-

japan.pdf.
373 See, e.g., Emergency Resolution to Seek Drastic Fiscal Measures for Civil Legal Aid
Activities,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
ASS'NS
(2002),
https://www.nichibenren.orjp/en/meetings/year/2002/20020524.html. In 2004, a law was enacted to
establish an independent agency, known as the Japan Legal Support Center, to provide civil legal aid
using full-time lawyers. See Duties ofthe Japan Legal Support Center and the JFBA, JAPAN FED'N B.
Ass'Ns, https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/judicialsystem/legal aid and jlsc.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2019); CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.01 [3][fJ(b). The JFBA has
continued to urge the government to expand legal aid in other contexts. See Reform of the Criminal
Justice
System,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
Ass'NS,
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/activities/Criminal Justice.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2019)
(urging the establishment of a court-appointed attorney system for suspects in criminal matters);
Provisional Legislative Proposal for the Realization of Government-Funded Legal Aid for Victims of
Crimes,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
Ass'NS
(Mar.
15,
2012),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20120315.html (urging the government to
provide legal aid for crime victims).
374
Justice
System
Reform,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
Ass'NS,
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/judicial system/justice system reform.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2019). These recommendations contributed to the passage of twenty-four laws related to justice
system reform by the end of 2004. Id.

375 120 CONG. REC. 22609 (daily ed. July 10, 1974).
376 Stuart Taylor, House Action Near in the Fight Over LegalAid, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 1981, at

B310.
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the ABA and other U.S. bar organizations have consistently opposed cuts
and advocated for increased funding for legal services for the poor.3 7 7
Some voluntary lawyer organizations have also advocated for a "civil
Gideon" requirement that would require the government to provide
indigent individuals with legal representation in certain civil cases.378
In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution, drafted with OAB's help, provides
that "the state shall provide full and free-of-charge legal assistance to all
who prove insufficiency of funds." 3 79 In most courts, parties must be
represented by a lawyer. 3 80 The Constitution provides for the creation of
states' Public Defender's Offices for individuals who cannot afford a
lawyer, 38 1 but some states failed to establish such offices. Instead, the
government relied on the ad hoc appointment of private lawyers to provide
legal aid in civil and criminal cases, paying the lawyers from government
funds.382 A public defenders' association successfully challenged the
constitutionality of relying entirely on private lawyers in Santa Catarina
and Slo Paulo, forcing these states to create public defender's offices. 383
Today, public defenders cannot meet the demand for legal

377 See, e.g., Rhonda McMillion, ABA Steps Up Calls for Increased Legal Service Corp.

Funding,

ABA

J.

(May

2014),

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aba steps upcalls for increased legal service corp._f
unding; Statement of ABA President re: Eliminated Funding for the Legal Services Corporation,
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news16,
2017),
(March
A.B.A.
Warn
Against
Lawyers
Marciano,
Michael
archives/2017/03/statement of abapre3.html;
"Devastating"Cuts to Legal Services, Conn. L. Trib., March 27, 2017, at 1.
378 States are required to provide criminal defendants who cannot afford a lawyer with counsel.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Some bar associations have advocated for a similar
requirement in civil cases. See, e.g., AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 11 2A
(2006),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid indigent defendants/Is sclaid
resolution 06al 12a.pdf; BOSTON BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS (2008),
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr 0809/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf; PHILA. B. ASS'N'S CIV. GIDEON
CORNER, http://philadelphiabar.org/page/CivilGideon.
379 CONSTITUlAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] tit. II, ch. 1, art. 5, ¶ LXXIV (Braz.);
Antonio Gidi & Hermes Zaneti, Jr., Brazilian Civil Procedure in the "Age ofAusterity"?, 8 ERASMUS
L. REV. 245, 247 (2015).
380 See Gidi & Zaneti, supra note 379, at 253.
381 CONSTITUiQAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 134 (Braz.).
382 See de Sa e Silva, supra note 120, at 235.
383 STFJulga InconstitucionalAtuaqdodo OAB No Lugar da Defensoria Pdblica em SC [STF
Deems the OAB Action in Place ofPublic Defenders in SC Unconstitutional],SUPREMO TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo-202643; PGR questiona lei que
determina realizaqgode convinio entre OAB-SP e Defensoria Pdblica [PGR Questions Law that
Determines Agreement between OAB-SP and Public Defender's Office], SUPREMO TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo-98000&caixaBusca-N.
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representation and so states also pay private lawyers to represent the
indigent clients. When the Sio Paulo state public defenders' office was
established, it took control over legal aid funding and recruitment of these
supplementary private lawyers, putting it in conflict with the bar, which
claimed it should be a mandatory intermediary in the recruitment
process.3 84 The bar ultimately lost that battle. As Fabio de Sa e Silva notes,
"the clear goal of the bar in this conflict was to protect-and to some
extent control-the market for legal services to the poor." 3 8 5 Thus, private
lawyers essentially compete with the public defenders for funding.
Public defenders do not all belong to the OAB,3 87 and this, too, may
account for why the OAB does not speak out for increased funding for
public defenders' offices.
In other democratic countries, support by the organized bar for legal
aid has emerged over time. In Israel, when the IBA Act passed in 1961,
there was little discussion of lawyers having any duties to ensure equal
access to justice. 8 When the government established a public defenders'
office for criminal defense in 1995, the bar's response was "ambiguous"expressing concern that many criminal defendants lacked representation,
but anxious about the entry of state-funded lawyers in a field dominated
by the private bar.3 89 The IBA has not supported increased funding for the
public defenders' office and has resisted expansion of its role. 3 9 0 It was not
until the late 1990s that the IBA began to evince real concern about access
to justice issues in the civil context.39 1 When the government proposed a
ten percent cut in civil legal aid funding in 2003 and 2007, the IBA
president objected, arguing that it would affect the quality of legal
representation for clients because lawyers would not be willing to work for

384 de Sa e Silva, supra note 120, at 235.

385 Id. at 235 n.25.
386 Juliana Dal Piva, When Justice Falls Short: Brazil Needs 10,000 More Public Defenders,
UNIVISION
NOTICIAS
(Apr.
7,
2017),
https://www.univision.com/noticias/criminalidad-yjusticia/when-justice-falls-short-brazil-needs-10-000-more-public-defenders.
387 In March 2018, the Superior Court decided that public defenders are not required to belong to
the OAB. STJ Resp. 1.710.555; Pedro Canirio, Defensores Publicos Ndo Precisam de Inscrigdo na
OAB, Decide 2a Turma do STJ [Public Defenders Do Not Need to be Registered in the OAB, Decides
2nd Class of STJ], CONSULTOR JURIDICO (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.conjur.com.br/2018-mar01/defensores-publicos-nao-inscritos-oab-decide-stj. That case is still pending in the courts.

388 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1637-38, 1646.
389 Id. at 1659. Prior to that time, publicly funded criminal defense was provided by the private
bar. Katvan et al., supra note 155.
390 Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal Profession, supra note 257, at 19-

20.
391 See Ziv, supra note 161, at 1659-61.
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the reduced fees. 3 9 2 Such cuts also affected the income of private lawyers
who were providing much of the legal aid.
Countries transitioning from socialist or communist government had
some history of legal aid. During the Soviet regime, lawyers practiced in
collectives (also known as "consultation offices") and the government set
the fees they could charge. 3 9 3 Lawyers were required to handle certain
types of cases (e.g., worker's compensation, alimony) and some matters
for classes of individuals (e.g., servicemen, the disabled) without
charge.394 Fees might also be waived in other types of cases if the client
could not afford them.3 9 5 In post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the constitution
provides that all citizens have the right to legal aid without charge if they
lack sufficient means to pay. 39 6 Nevertheless, there is a shortage of legal
aid lawyers in some areas and the pay is very low. 3 9 7 The 2016 Law on
State Guaranteed Legal Aid provides for legal aid for income-qualified
individuals in criminal, civil, and administrative cases.398 The Ministry of
Justice initiated the drafting of the law, but the Advokatura added a
recommendation to increase funding for legal aid.399 Of course, since
advocates would be paid from those funds, this recommendation also
reflected lawyers' self-interest.
Likewise in 1981, the Qaddafi regime enacted legislation that
mandated that all Libyan lawyers become salaried members of the
Department of People's Legal Defense.400 Even after the regime permitted
lawyers to resume private practice, those who continued as "people's
lawyers" provided free representation to Libyans. 40 1 After 2011, people's

392 Knesset Comm. for Constitution, Law and Justice, Transcript Number 6522, June 9, 2003;
Knesset Comm. for Constitution, Law and Justice, Transcript No. 120, Jan. 23, 2007. In 2007, the IBA
also advocated against cutting the funding for the Public Defender's office. Protocol of Government
Legis. Comm., Jan. 23, 2007 (Isr.).
393 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & V. M. SAVITSKI, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR 43
(1979); GEORGE DANA CAMERON, THE SOVIET LAWYER AND HIS SYSTEM 55 (1978).
394 CAMERON, supra note 393, at 55-56.
395 BASSIOUNI & SAVITSKI, supra note 393, at 43.
396 CONST. OF KYRGYz REPUBLIC, art. 40, ¶ 3.
397 See ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 46-47; ODIHR REPORT ON THE REGIONAL EXPERT
ROUNDTABLE ON LEGAL AID IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN CENTRAL ASIA 17 (2013),
https://www.osce.org/odihr/104375?download-true.
398 ELIDA K. NOGOIBAEVA & SANIlA TOKTOGAZIEVA, FREE LEGAL AID IN THE KYRGYZ
REPUBLIC: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN RENDERING LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR
VULNERABLE GROUPS 3 (2017).
399 E-mail from Azamat Kerimbaev, ABA ROLI Country Director in Kyrgyzstan, to Leslie C.
Levin (Feb. 14, 2018, 05 5:14 EDT) (on file with authors).
400 Carlisle, supra note 193.
401 Id.
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lawyers-who receive different training than private lawyers 4 02
continued to provide free representation in criminal cases and in some
civil and administrative cases.403 Only private lawyers belong to the LBA,
which seemingly has not advocated for increased support for legal aid.
Private lawyers often view people's lawyers with suspicion because they
enabled the Qaddafi government by representing defendants in the
notoriously unfair People's Courts.40 4 Practically speaking, Libya's
political instability makes it difficult for the courts in the country to
function.4 05 Legal aid, to the extent it exists, appears to be provided by
funding from donors outside of Libya.40 6
In China, the impetus for a well-developed legal aid system has mainly
come from the government. The government's Five-Year Plan for
National Economic and Social Development (2001-2005) made
developing a legal aid system a goal.40 7 China's 2003 regulations on Legal
Aid state that the government has a duty to provide legal aid.408
Government funding has increased in recent years, providing legal aid in
criminal cases and in some civil and administrative matters by lawyers,
public notaries, legal affairs workers, and others. 4 0 9 Even though China
still has unmet legal needs and uneven quality of representation,4 10 lawyer
organizations have rarely sought to influence the law on this issue. 4 1 1 This
may be because the government has been active in working to expand
legal aid,4 12 because the bar leadership does not want to be viewed as

402 Carlisle, supra note 204, at 82.
403 Nasser Algheitta, The Role of Criminal Defence Lawyers in the Administration of Justice in
Libya: Challenges and Prospects, in SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE IN POST-GADDAFI LIBYA, supra note

204, at 96.
404 See Carlisle, supra note 193. In contrast, many private practitioners had refused to appear in
the People's Courts because of the abuses that occurred there. Id.

405 Id.
406 See, e.g., Lori Brumat, Libya: Meet Salah, Keeping Hope for Redress in the Absence of a
State,
Amid
a
Civil
War, OMCT
(Dec.
2015),
http://www.omct.org/human-rightsdefenders/links/libya/2015/12/d23507/ (describing Libyan Network for Legal Aid).
407 Legal Aid, CHINA LEGAL INFO. CTR., http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinalic/2017-

07/07/content 30036063.htm (last updated July 7, 2017).
408 Id.; AARON HALEGUA, U.S.-ASIA L. INST., WHO WILL REPRESENT CHINA'S WORKERS?
LAWYERS,
LEGAL
AID,
AND
THE
ENFORCEMENT
OF LEGAL
RIGHTS
22 (2016),
https://static I.squarespace.com/static/53960c86e4b01 0f46523dl fc/t/57flcedd9de4bb8a69b0cfbd/l 524

770150399/Halegua%2C+Who+Will+Represent+China%27s+Workers%3F+%28201 6%29.pdf.
409 HALEGUA, supra note 408, at 19; Allen C. Choate, Legal Aid in China app. I (Asia
Foundation
Working
Paper
Series,
No.
12,
2000),
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpanO17813.pdf.
410 HALEGUA, supra note 408, at 20-23, 28-29.
411 One exception was that in 2006, ACLA issued an opinion calling upon provincial-level
governments to provide legal aid to migrant workers. Id. at 35.
412 For example, in February 2018 the vice Minister of Justice announced plans to expand legal
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critical of the government, or because the lawyers' organizations do not
view this to be their responsibility.
Addressing the access to justice problem presents challenges for the
legal profession, because it pits some lawyers' economic interests against
the goal of helping litigants better navigate the legal system without a
lawyer. Yet lawyer organizations also recognize that by not addressing
access to justice, non-lawyers may be given greater latitude to represent
parties in court and elsewhere. This tension helps explain some of the
organized bars' battles over pro bono. In the United States, a few bar
organizations have proposed a pro bono requirement, but most lawyer
organizations have opposed it.41 3 In Israel, division in the IBA arose over
whether to establish even a voluntary pro bono program, with some
members objecting due to concerns about unfair competition and its
impact on lawyers' livelihoods.414 The IBA eventually supported pro bono
in 2002, and in 2009 it initiated legislation for the first time for the IBA4 15
but not individual lawyers-to provide free legal services to the poor.
The pro bono story in Brazil similarly reflects divisions in the bar. The
corporate bar and legal elite supported the idea of pro bono service,
because it reflected clients' interests in corporate social responsibility,
which was transmitted by international organizations, and also elite
lawyers' conceptions of their role in society. 4 1 6 Yet other lawyers,
including some who represented low-income clients, viewed pro bono
practice as unfair competition for clients and pressured the OAB
leadership to limit or prohibit it. 4 17 The OAB in Sdo Paulo became
persuaded that pro bono could lead to unfair competition and adopted a
rule that limited pro bono work to the giving of legal advice outside of
court to non-profit organizations, but not to individuals who could not pay

aid so that it is available to all villagers. China to Build National Public Legal Service by 2020, CHINA
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinalic/20182018),
8,
(Feb.
CTR.
INFO.
LEGAL

02/08/content_35686609.htm.
413 See Leslie C. Levin, Pro Bono and Low Bono in the Solo and Small Firm Context, in PRIVATE
LAWYERS & THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
155, 158 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009); Scott Cummings, The Politics ofPro Bono, 52

UCLA L. REV. 1, 30-32 (2004).
414 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1665; Ziv, supra note 233, at 1780; Ruth Sinai, Practicing Law as a
Mission, HAARETZ, Dec. 13, 2001. Prior to that time, the IBA's ethics code provided that lawyers must
be paid for legal representation. See Sinai, supra.
415 Dan Izenberg, Bill Would Oblige Bar to Provide Free Legal Aid, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 13,
2009. It took five years before the legislation was enacted. Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 144.

416 de Sa e Silva, supranote 120, at 217, 223.
417 See id at 224; Almeida & Nassar, supra note 124, at 202-03; Bonelli & Fortes, supra note

122.

650

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

18:589

for legal services.4 18 It was only after the Federal Minist6rio Piiblico held a
public hearing about this bar regulation, signaling that he would litigate
against it, that the OAB rewrote the pro bono rule so that pro bono legal
service could be performed for needy individuals. 4 19

D. Acting to Advance Human Rights or to Address Other Issues
Affecting Civil Society
Besides their efforts to benefit themselves, their clients, or the judicial
system, lawyer organizations also work to advance human rights or other
ideological or political issues. The JFBA, for example, publicizes its
positions on a wide range of issues, seeking to promote human rights or
oppose government actions it views as illegitimate. For instance, in 2014
the JFBA called on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's ruling coalition to
withdraw legislation that would allow Japan's self-defense forces to fight
to protect allies even without a direct threat to Japan. The bar saw the
legislation as contrary to Japan's Constitution, which states: "the right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 4 2 0 The JFBA joined
demonstrations and spoke out to oppose this legislation, which ultimately
passed notwithstanding strong public opposition. 42 1 The JFBA has also
taken a stand on many human rights issues, such as capital punishment.422
In addition, the JFBA has advocated on purely political issues, such as

418 Almeida & Nassar, supra note 124, at 203-04; de Sa e Silva, supra note 120, at 225.
419 Almeida & Nassar, supra note 124, at 204; de Sa e Silva, supra note 120, at 236-38.
420 NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan); JFBA Opposes Right to
Collective Self-Defense, Nuclear Power, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 30, 2014.
421
Opinion Concerning the Cabinet's Decision Approving the Exercise of the Right to
Collective
Self-Defense,
etc.,
Japan
Fed'n
B.
Ass'ns
(Sept.
18,
2014),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20140918.html;
64th JFBA General Meeting - Resolution Opposing the Approval of Exercising the Right to
Collective
Self-Defense,
Japan
Fed'n
B.
Ass'ns
(May
31,
2013),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/130531.html;
Agence France-Presse, Japan
Lawyers Join Opposition to Controversial Security Bills, Defense News (Aug. 26, 2015),
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2015/08/26/japan-lawyers-join-opposition-tocontroversial-security-bills.
422 Statement Protesting Execution of the Death Penalty and Reiterating Our Request for
Suspension of Executions and the Launch of a Nationwide Debate on the Abolition of the Death
Penalty,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
ASS'NS
(Sept
12,
2013),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2013/130912.html;
Statement
on
Executions
of
Death
Penalty,
JAPAN
FED'N
B.
Ass'NS
(Apr.
27,
2007),
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2007/20070427.htm; Elaine Lies, Japan
Lawyer s
Group
Seeks
to
End
Death
Penalty,
REUTERS
(Oct.
7,
2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-deathpenalty-idUSKCN127190.
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urging the government to withdraw from nuclear power generation in the
wake of Japan's 2011 nuclear disaster and seeking changes in the
agreement with the United States concerning the presence of U.S. armed
forces in Japan.4 23
Like in Japan, the legal profession in Brazil views its role as a protector
of civil liberties and human rights. 4 2 4 By the mid-1970s, the OAB was
fighting political repression precipitated by the 1964 military coup and it
eventually played a significant role in the democratization of the
country.4 25 The OAB has also involved itself in other human rights
activities. Starting in 1980, the OAB formed Human Rights Commissions
in its federal council and regional associations.4 26 It has spoken out on
racial discrimination and in 2008, it asked the Supreme Court to exempt
torture that occurred during the military regime from the Amnesty Law to
allow prosecution of those responsible for killings.427 In 1992, the OAB's
president filed charges for high crimes against the then-President Collor de
Mello, which led to his impeachment.428 The OAB also voted in 2016 to
support the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and to add new
impeachment charges of obstructing justice.4 29 This vote put the GAB
squarely in the midst of political conflict and was controversial within the
organization. Indeed, the smaller, voluntary IAB opined that it considered
the impeachment of Rousseff to be unconstitutional.43 0

423 See Statement Callingfor the Realization of Non-Nuclear Power Policies through the Early
Establishment of the Basic Law on Non-Nuclear Power Plants, JAPAN FED'N B. Ass'NS (Sept. 21,
2012), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2012/120921.html; Opinion with
Regardto the Status of ForcesAgreement Between Japan and the U.S., JAPAN FED'N B. ASS'NS (Feb.
20, 2014), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20140220 2.html.
424 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text; TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 115; Falcho,
supra note 110, at 426.
425 See, e.g., ALVES, supra note 116, at 149, 157, 161-62; Junqueira, supra note 116, at 163.
426 TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 112; Falcio, supra note 110, at 426.
427 Cecilia MacDowell Santos, TransnationalLegal Activism and the State: Reflections on Case
Against Brazil in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 4 SUR. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL
DE DIREITOS HUMANOS 29 (2007); Nina Schneider, Impunity in Post-authoritarianBrazil: The
Supreme Court's Recent Verdict on the Amnesty Law, 90 EUR. REV. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD.

39, 49 (2011).
428 E-mail from Fabio de Sa e Silva, Professor of Brazilian Studies, University of Oklahoma, to

Lynn Mather (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:33 EST) (on file with authors). Collor resigned just before the
impeachment trial, but the Brazilian Senate held the trial and voted for impeachment. See Alexandra
Rattinger, The Impeachment Process of Brazil: A ComparativeLook at Impeachment in Brazil and the
United States, 49 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 129, 149 (2018).
429 Anthony Boadle, Brazil Lawyers File New Impeachment Case Against Rousseff REUTERS
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://reut.rs/1MOnFcP.
Inconstitucional, Diz Instituto dos Advogados do Brasil
430 Impeachment de Dilma
[Impeachment of Dilma is Unconstitutional, Says Brazilian Bar Association], CONSULTOR JURIDICO
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-ago-05/iab-aprova-parecer-contrario-impeachment-
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In contrast to Japan and Brazil, the Israeli bar does not share a deep
tradition of speaking out on social justice or other issues concerning civil
society.4 3 ' During its first forty years, the IBA rarely became involved in
public matters unrelated to the legal system or legal representation.432 In
the 1990s, some IBA members formed a group within the IBA called
Lishka Acheret ("A Different Bar") that challenged the bar to speak out
against human rights abuses. 4 3 3 In 1999, they helped elect an IBA
president with a "left-liberal" agenda who demanded that the IBA take on
position human rights issues in Israel and the West Bank.434 Thereafter, the
IBA's Human Rights Committee warned soldiers who were carrying out
targeted assassinations of Palestinian militants and officers who ordered
demolitions of houses owned by Palestinians that military personnel could
be prosecuted for war crimes.43 5 It has also spoken out against gender
discrimination in the military.4 36
Bar associations in the United States have a mixed tradition of
speaking out on human rights and rule of law issues, but for somewhat
different reasons. As previously noted, mandatory U.S. bar associations
are often unable to use bar dues to promote political positions.43 7
Sometimes voluntary lawyer organizations also encounter difficulty
speaking out on certain issues. When the ABA's House of Delegates
adopted a resolution in 1990 in favor of a woman's right to an abortion, it
faced strong dissent from its politically diverse membership, and
ultimately retreated from that position.43 8 Yet the ABA was able to pass a
resolution in 1997 calling for a moratorium on capital punishment until
jurisdictions improved their sentencing policies and procedures. Critics of
the resolution argued that, like abortion, this was a political matter, but
advocates successfully argued that the issue of capital punishment directly
related to the judicial system. 4 39 The ABA also acted to influence the law

431 Barzilai, supra note 174, at 255, 259.
432 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Ziv, supra note 161, at 1659.

433 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1662.
434 See Katvan et al., supra note 155.
435 Ferry Biederman, Human Rights Groups File Petition Against Israeli Army, INTER PRESS

SERV., Jan. 25, 2002.
436 Yaakov Lappin, IDF Rejects Allegations of Discrimination Against Female Soldiers
Receiving Fertility Treatment, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.jpost.com/IsraelNews/I DF-rej ects-allegati on s-of-d iscri minati on -again st-female-soldiers-rececivi ng-fertil ity-treatment-

447230.
437 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
438 See, e.g., David Margolick, Bar Group, in Shift, Adopts Neutral Policy on Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at A20.
439 Austin Sarat, State Transformation and the Strugglefor Symbolic Capital: Cause Lawyers,
the Organized Bar, and Capital Punishment in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE
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concerning the "war on terrorism" by opposing the use of torture.4 40 Other
voluntary bar organizations in the United States have also sought to
influence the law with respect to human rights and rule of law issues.
Thus, the Massachusetts Bar Association has called for the end of the
government policy that resulted in the separation of immigrant children
from their parents at the U.S. border. 4 4 1 The National Bar Association,
composed of predominantly African-American attorneys and judges, has
met with members of the legislative and executive branches to advance
their agenda, including dismantling the system of mass incarceration.4 42
Even in authoritarian regimes, lawyer organizations sometimes act
collectively to influence human rights and the rule of law. In Libya,
notwithstanding the Qaddafi regime's significant control over lawyers, the
Tripoli Bar Association attempted to take an active role in monitoring
human rights.4 43 In 2008, it wrote a letter to authorities demanding the
investigation of the kidnapping of lawyer Dhaw Al-Mansuri, president of
the Center for Democracy, and in 2009, it established a fact-finding
committee that requested access to Ain Zara prison. 4 The Benghazi
courthouse and the Benghazi Bar Association were "cradles of rebellion"
in the final year of Qaddafi's rule.44 5 Post Qaddafi, international
organizations have worked with the LBA and other lawyer organizations
to support the bar in its efforts to ensure free elections and advance human
rights. 4 4 6 Yet in Kyrgyzstan, where lawyer organizations remain relatively

STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 87, at 186, 202-04.
440 AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION
10-B (2004),
04
10
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/torture/torturepolicy20
B.pdf (resolution condemning use of torture). The ABA has also been very active in promoting human
A.B.A.,
to
Justice,
Access
and
Rights
Human
ROLL
ABA
through
rights
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of law/what-we-do/human-rights-access-to-justice.html

(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
441 Massachusetts Bar Association President: End Border Policy that Separate Children from
Parents, MASS. B. Ass'N NEWS (June 20, 2018), https://www.massbar.org/docs/default-source/pressreleases/2018/06-20-18-massbar-president---end-border-policy-that-separates-children-fromparents.pdfsfvrsn-8 (referring to policy as "inhumane" and "immoral").
442 Benjamin L. Crump, A Year in Review, NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., July 2016, at 20,

https://gallery.mailchimp.com/b493e6c4d31beda32fdaf8e2d/files/FINAL NBA Magazine 2016.01.p
df.
443 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRUTH AND JUSTICE CAN'T WAIT: HUMAN RIGHTS
(2009),
29
OBSTACLES
INSTITUTIONAL
AMID
LIBYA
IN
DEVELOPMENTS
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libyal209webwcover.pdf.

444 Id. at 29, 32.
445 ILAC, supra note 91, at 61. Khalid al-Saji, the chairman of the LBA, was reportedly one of
the fourteen men who launched the revolt. Clemens Hoges, A Courthouse in Benghazi: The Nerve
Center of the Revolution, DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a2 27
.html.
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446 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Rule of Law Initiative, Libyan Lawyers Preparefor Elections, July
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new, they have not been actively involved in human rights advocacy.47
The mandatory Advokatura has focused primarily on internal issues. 8
In China, the bar associations rarely seek to influence the law relating
to human rights issues, in part, due to state control. Nevertheless, in 2001,
the Beijing Lawyers Association set up a Committee on Constitutional
Law and Human Rights (CCLHR), and in 2004, ACLA created a similar
committee. 4 4 9 For a while, the CCLHR offered a platform for politically
liberal lawyers to develop professional networks and in the mid-2000s, to
become involved in rights defense cases.4 50 In 2007, the BLA effectively
ended the "human rights" aspects of the CCLH{R. 4 5 1 Nevertheless,
networks of activist lawyers in China have continued to advance a number
of human rights issues including freedom of speech and religion.452 They
have worked online with international lawyer organizations, UN advocacy
groups, and NGOs to push for expanded human rights in China.45 3
IV. WHEN AND WHY Do LAWYER
ORGANIZATIONS ACT TO INFLUENCE LAW?

Although only seven countries are examined here, the discussion
provides some insights into collective lawyer activities to influence law.
At the very least, lawyer organizations must have the ability to act on legal
issues. Their ability, in turn, depends on their strength as organizations,
something that organizational theories can help explain. Broadly speaking,
their ability to act depends on the organization's micro-level
characteristics, relations between the lawyer organization and the state,
and support for the profession from the international legal community.
Characteristics of the lawyer organization constitute one important
factor that affects organizations' ability to influence law. New lawyer
associations such as Kyrgyz's Advokatura face questions of legitimacy-

27, 2012 (on file with authors); Promoting Change Through Women's Legal Network in Libya, supra
note 208.
447 They have, however, cooperated in providing workshops aimed at training human rights
lawyers. See Empowering Young Lawyers in Kyrgyzstan Through Human Rights Training, UN HUM.
RIGHTS
OFF.
OF
THE
HIGH
COMM'R
(Dec.
30,
2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/EmpoweringyounglawyersinKyrgyzstan.aspx.
448 E-mail from Azamat Kerimbaev, ABA ROLl Country Director in Kyrgyzstan, to Leslie C.

Levin (Mar. 20, 2018: 1:23 EDT) (on file with authors).
449 Liu & Halliday, supra note 222, at 12-13.
450 Id. at 13.
451 Id. at 14.
452 Liu & HALLIDAY, supra note 214, at 101-04; see also Fu, supra note 227, at 565 (describing
advocacy on issues relating to discrimination).

453 Id. at 158-60.
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even among its members-that likely inhibit any such efforts. New
associations must also focus on establishing internal structures and rules
before attempting lawmaking on issues unrelated to their own immediate
interests. In contrast, older established bar associations such as in Brazil
and the United States have a history of-and mechanisms for-working to
influence the law. Such mechanisms include, for example, the OAB's
constitutional standing to file cases before Brazil's Supreme Court, and the
ABA's Governmental Affairs Office in Washington, D.C., which conveys
the ABA's views to government entities.454 As voluntary lawyer
associations become stronger and attract more members, they may also
become more solvent, enabling them to hire staff (e.g., lobbyists, public
relations personnel) to facilitate efforts to influence the law.45 5
The membership composition of lawyer organizations also affects their
ability to act. Organizations with lawyers from different practice settings
or political ideologies tend to disagree about preferred directions of legal
change and whether to take action at all. When lawyer organizations fail to
act, new organizations may emerge. In the United States, when elite bar
associations failed to represent the interests of non-elite members, new
lawyer associations sprung up to fulfill those needs. Likewise, new
organizations were established in Japan to work for political and social
changes that some lawyers sought.
The method of decision making within a lawyer organization also
influences its ability to act. For instance, in China, the governmentselected bar leadership controls many of its decisions. In hierarchical
lawyer organizations, bar leaders can act on behalf of the organization,
allowing them some political space to advance their own values or
ambitions. This can be seen in Brazil's OAB, where decision making is
consolidated within a fairly small group of leaders, and in Israel's IBA,
where its president can speak freely on many issues. In contrast, in lawyer
organizations such as the ABA, which requires voting by the almost 600member House of Delegates, leaders have a more difficult time convincing
members to act on law reform. This can sometimes be circumvented,
however, by pronouncements by the ABA president, or actions by ABA
committees, which do not require such approval.
In addition, the relationship between lawyer organizations and the state
reveals a good deal about lawyers' collective ability to influence the law.
Authoritarian governments, like China or Libya under Qaddafi, can limit

454 See supra note 128 and accompanying text; Advocacy & Initiatives,supra note 105.
455 See HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 290, 304.
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lawyer organizations' ability to operate autonomously, especially on
matters that threaten state interests. Efforts within such organizations by
rank and file lawyers to affect the law-or even to achieve selfgovernance of the organizations-can be readily thwarted and even
dangerous.
Even in democracies, laws governing lawyer organizations can limit or
facilitate their ability to act to influence the law.456 In Israel, lawyers
cannot form other bar associations, thus presenting obstacles for lawyers
with different views from IBA leadership from acting collectively. In the
United States, mandatory state bars are constrained in their ability to
engage in advocacy for political or ideological purposes. Yet in Brazil, the
GAB has legal standing to directly challenge state actions it views as
unconstitutional, making it easier for that association to act on a wide
range of subjects.
The emergence of international actors and transnational legal orders
changes relations between organizations and the state. For the legal
profession in particular, a growing global legal community focused on rule
of law and human rights issues has empowered lawyer organizations in
many countries, sometimes allowing them to counter state power. When
working with lawyer organizations, groups such as the International Bar
Association and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe transmit
international standards contained in the U.N Basic Principles on the Role
of Lawyers and the European Parliament's Resolution on the Legal
Professions.4 57 Global lawyer organizations also provide support to
informal lawyer networks in their attempts to influence law in China and
elsewhere. In Libya, immediately after the fall of Qaddafi, the organized
bar received assistance from ABA ROLI in its work on legislation that
restored the bar's autonomy. ABA ROLI also helped advocates in
Kyrgyzstan with the law establishing the Advokatura.
Even when lawyer associations are able to attempt to influence law,
other factors affect why they do so. Consider the many different activities
of the lawyer organizations in these seven countries. Why the

456 Government policy can also constrain lawyer organizations from acting. For example, the
ABA was constrained from directly participating in efforts to draft a code of conduct for the
International Criminal Court because the United States had not ratified the treaty establishing the
court. See Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 454.
457 These standards emphasize the importance of lawyer independence and advance the view that
lawyers have a crucial role to play in promoting justice and guaranteeing respect for human rights. See
U.N. Basic Principleson the Role of Lawyers, supra note 14, at arts. 4, 14, 16, 23-24; Resolution on
the Legal Professions and the General Interest in the Functioning of Legal Systems, EUR. PARL. Doc.

P6 TA(2006)0108, pts. A, D, E, K(4) (2006).
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organizations acted-or why they did not-can be explained by elements
of organization theory as applied to the legal profession.
Viewing lawyer groups as rational, self-interested actors provides one
important lens for understanding why lawyer organizations act. That is,
they act to advance their professional power and status through efforts to
preserve lawyers' autonomy, define and expand the legal market, and
protect themselves from attack. In Israel and many U.S. jurisdictions,
lawyers also sought compulsory bar membership to enable them to
advocate more effectively for the profession.45 8 Organizations lobbied
against expansion of the size of the bar in Israel, Japan, and Brazil, and for
restrictions on foreign lawyers. The frequency of lobbying by lawyer
organizations to protect lawyers from competition also supports theories of
organizational maintenance. When successful, such lobbying brings
material benefits to their members and also strengthens the organizations.
When lawyer organizations work on law to benefit their clients, they
may also benefit lawyers themselves-for example, by making their work
easier, expanding the pool of clients, or making their work more
remunerative. Examples from the commercial context in China, Israel, and
the United States show bar associations attempting to influence the law in
order to provide benefits for their corporate clients. Likewise, lawyer
organizations in Brazil, Israel, Japan and the United States opposed antimoney laundering regulation that would force lawyers to disclose client
information. Yet, new institutionalist explanations also apply here since
such lobbying may reflect the shared norms and ways of seeing the world
of corporate lawyers and their corporate clients.45 9 Or, to take an example
from specialty bars in the United States, when plaintiffs' lawyers,
immigration lawyers or criminal defense bars work on law reform, they
can be understood as pursuing shared ideological goals when they seek to
advance their clients' causes. In other words, mutual ideals-rooted in
institutional culture-and not only self-interest, may explain the actions of
lawyer organizations. Indeed, such efforts to advance clients' interests
may entail costs for lawyers. Attempts by networks of criminal defense
lawyers in China to expose rights violations by state officials would
benefit their clients. But such advocacy also came at great personal cost to

458 See, e.g., DAYTON D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR41, 45 (1963); Gallagher, supra note
232, at 522-25 (providing examples of lawyers asking the courts to form mandatory U.S. state bar
associations); E-mail from Limor Zer-Gutman, Lecturer, Haim Striks School of Law, to Leslie C.

Levin (Feb. 23, 2019, 16:33 EST) (on file with authors).
459 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that corporate lawyers and clients
have similar normative views due to their shared institutional culture).
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the lawyers as they risked arrest or loss of their licenses for their actions.
Lawyer organizations in all seven countries devoted energy to issues
directly affecting the courts and the administration of justice. This third
category can also be explained, in part, by the shared cultural and political
values of lawyers in their institutional sector, which permeate individual
organizations. That is, political liberalism motivates lawyers in some
countries to work collectively for due process and the rule of law, and to
oppose an authoritarian state and a weak judiciary. In Kyrgyzstan, where
lawyer organizations view the courts as corrupt or lacking legitimacy, they
sometimes act through projects designed to increase the independence and
integrity of the judiciary. 4 6 0 Even where courts are stronger institutions,
lawyer organizations may oppose the courts if the courts' actions are seen
as threatening the rule of law. Thus, in Israel, the IBA opposed the
Supreme Court when it believed the court was exceeding its institutional
power and acting on political questions. In Brazil and Japan, lawyer
associations spoke out when they believed the courts were not acting
expeditiously or fairly.
In democratic countries, such as Brazil, Israel, Japan, and the United
States, lawyer organizations have worked to strengthen the courts and to
defend the judiciary when it was under attack. Selfless reasons alone do
not explain such organizational actions. Since lawyers' legitimacy and
importance often depend upon the courts' legitimacy, lawyer organizations
have a vested interest in maintaining the independence and integrity of the
judiciary. In addition, in countries like the United States, the courts often
protect lawyers from extensive legislative regulation,46 1 so ensuring the
independence of the courts from the other political branches serves
lawyers' interests as well.
Conflicts sometimes arise, however, between lawyers' self-interests
and their interest in improving courts and the administration of justice.
This can be seen in some efforts to expand access to justice, which
promotes the rule of law and improves the administration of justice.
Lawyer organizations lobbied to expand government funding for legal
services in Japan and the United States, which would increase access to
justice and presumably, fees paid to legal aid lawyers. But lawyer
associations in Brazil and Israel were divided over lawyers engaged in pro

460 See supra notes 348-49 and accompanying text. Of course, in some cases, advocates may not
be motivated by political liberalism, but may simply wish to spare their clients the cost of paying
bribes or may prefer to work in a system in which corruption is less pervasive.
461 BARTON H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 113, 115-

20(2011).
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bono due, in part, to concerns about their economic self-interest in being
paid for their work. These examples underscore how conflict over what
constitutes an organization's "self-interest" in a heterogeneous lawyer
organization complicates its decision to work for or against legal change.
Finally, the importance of the norms and values of political liberalism,
with lawyers working to curb state power and promote a moderate state,
was shown through actions by lawyer associations in Brazil, Japan, Libya,
and the United States to promote human rights, defend political prisoners,
and support persecuted minorities. When lawyers conceive of their
professional role in society as important for moderating the state and
historically have done so, they sometimes act to influence law for that
purpose. Thus, as previously noted, Japan's lawyer organizations have a
long-standing commitment to social justice and a history of opposition to
the state, which includes active pursuit of civil rights and human rights
agendas. Similarly, in Brazil, the OAB views itself as a defender of
democratic values. The history of both organizations has empowered them
to engage with wide-ranging political issues that are removed from
concerns about lawyers or the judiciary, such as the JFBA's opposition to
nuclear power and the OAB's votes for presidential impeachment.
As historic institutionalism would suggest, the history of other lawyer
organizations makes them more reluctant to speak out on political issues.
In Israel, when the Knesset debated the act creating the IBA in 1961, most
of the discussions "rested upon an assumption that the bar does not carry
strong societal or other collective commitments."4 62 This shared
assumption "imprinted" the organization so that until the early 2000s, the
IBA focused its efforts to influence the law primarily on issues affecting
the interests of lawyers, clients, and the legal system, narrowly defined. In
China, lawyers operate within a society that shares an altogether different
conception of the state and the individual rooted in traditional attitudes
about the importance of social harmony and reinforced by communist
ideology. It is not just that there is little history of opposition to the state,
but rather, it is contrary to societal values to do so.
Even when lawyer organizations prefer to avoid political engagement,
however, cause lawyers may be able to "push" them to take action,
especially during periods of political conflict or crisis.463 Cause lawyers in

&

462 Ziv, supra note 166, at 62.
463 ECON. & Soc. RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EFECTIVENESS OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN CONFLICT
https://lawyersconflictandtransition.org/themainevent/wp2016),
(Dec.
25
CRISIS

content/uploads/2014/07/THE-EFFECTIVENESS-OF-BAR-ASSOCIATIONS-IN-CONFLICT-ANDCRISIS.pdf. See also McEvoy & Rebouche, supra note 50, at 276.
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the United States, for example, were able to move the ABA to call for a
moratorium on the hotly contested issue of the death penalty.4 64 In Israel in
the 1990s, some IBA members eventually moved the bar to speak out
against human rights abuses involving Israeli security forces and Israel's
military.4 65 In China, activist lawyers were eventually able to force ACLA
and the Guangxi Provincial Lawyers Association to express support for
accused lawyers who had been detained in Beihai.
Lawyer organizations, like all organizations, make compromises not
only to satisfy members with diverging views, but also to negotiate their
relationship with the state and institutional actors. As organizational
theories suggest, rational organizational leaders might lobby government
for benefits for their membership, but at the same time they must be
concerned with organizational survival. Since groups operate in
competition with others, according to environmental ecology theory, the
need for organizational survival might mean foregoing efforts to influence
the law in order to garner support from other interest groups or
institutions. The I3A, for example, has supported Israel's Ministry of
Justice in the selection of right-leaning judges in apparent exchange for
protection of the IBA's right to self-regulate.4 66 The ABA eventually
modified its confidentiality rules to align with the Securities and Exchange
Commission's efforts to regulate lawyer conduct to maintain its influence
in the realm of lawyer regulation.46 7
Yet even where lawyer organizations historically have worked to
promote political liberalism, there may be times when they will not do so.
Halliday, Karpik and Feeley argue that the "legal complex" mobilizes
selectively for legal freedom. 4 6 8 They identify two instances where the
legal complex will not act despite a history of commitment to political
liberalism (observations that seemingly also apply to lawyer

464 See Sarat, supranote 439, at 189-90, 196-201, 204-05.
465 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1663.
466 See Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal Profession, supra note 257, at
22-25; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Will Israel Bar Association President Allegations End Shaked's
Revolution?, JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Will-Israel-BarAssociation-president-allegations-end-Shakeds-revolution-575500; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Shaked, Hayut
Battle Over Future of High Court, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/IsraelNews/Shaked-Hayut-battle-over-future-of-High-Court-543206.
467 See, e.g., Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken ": An Instant History of the Battle Over
Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 279-81 (2009); Roger C. Cramton et al.,

Legal and EthicalDuties ofLawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley,49 VILL. L. REv. 725, 728-33 (2004).
468 Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley use the term "legal complex" to mean "the system of relations
among legally trained occupations which mobilize on a particular issue." See Halliday et al., supra
note 86, at 6-7. This may include, for example, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, legal academics, and
others depending upon the country and the issue.
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organizations). One is when a "singular moment punctuates an otherwise
liberal record" or what historical institutionalists call a "critical
moment.'A 69 An example would be when the United States was gripped by
fear of Communism in the 1950s and the ABA did little to oppose
McCarthyism.4 70 A second instance of inaction by the legal complex is
where an "enduring threat inhibits a legal complex from extending its
habitual liberalism to every issue."471 This can be seen in the reluctance of
the Israeli bar to speak out forcefully on the rights of Palestinians and on
national security issues.47 2 In that case, the perceived threat to the security
of the state allowed government leaders to supersede legal protections.
As the preceding discussion suggests, environmental forces on
organizations play a large role in why organizations act (or fail to act),
suggesting the importance of asking: What is the historical role of lawyer
organizations with respect to the state? What is lawyers' collective
understanding of their role? That is, how do lawyers see their role as legal
professionals in these countries? Whose interests are they representingthe government's? The public's? Their clients'? Their own? Does the
public mood provide political space for action or are security threats
perceived to be too grave? Lawyer organizations operate in a wider
institutional and organizational setting, and this embeddedness affects
their actions. Where do allies or opponents of the organization stand on an
issue? Are lawyers within the organization acting to push particular
causes, or are global lawyer organizations encouraging action?
Even when lawyer organizations lobby on an issue, there may be
multiple reasons behind it. That is to say, internal organizational politics
also explain group efforts. Lawyer associations are comprised of many
members and the activities of the leaders may not reflect the priorities or
views of the rank and file. Likewise, committee actions and statements can
be at odds with others within the same lawyer organization. In addition,
when seeking to influence law, lawyer organizations-like any other
political actor-use public interest rhetoric to justify positions that internal
deliberations reveal to be based on self-interest.

469 Id. at 25.
470 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 238-39 (1976). In fact, the ABA recommended that lawyers attest to their anti-Communist
loyalty by being required to take an anti-Communist oath. Id. at 239-40 Not all U.S. bar associations
supported McCarthy's investigations. See, e.g., GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE
CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 263-64 (1997).
471 Halliday et al., supra note 86, at 25.
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CONCLUSION

This attempt to map the terrain is limited in several respects, including
that it focuses mostly on the largest lawyer organizations in seven
countries and does not provide a fine-grained account of their internal
deliberations. In addition, this study only reviews efforts by lawyer
organizations to influence law over the last few decades. The picture might
look quite different in ten years. For instance, as Kyrgyz's new
Advokatura becomes more established, it may be able to look beyond
advocates' interests to engage in additional lawmaking efforts. This will
depend, in part, on internal politics in Kyrgyzstan, and whether advocates'
conceptions of their role in society changes from the views prevalent in
the Soviet period to those that align with international standards. Likewise,
if the political situation in Libya proceeds in a democratic direction, the
LBA may be able to act in additional ways to strengthen government
institutions and to otherwise influence the law. Alternatively, in the future
it may become much more difficult for lawyer organizations to act, with
reactionary or authoritarian powers reasserting control as they have
recently done in Hungary and Turkey. The internet and international
lawyer organizations will no doubt continue to disseminate norms and
values, and empower-or limit-lawyer organizations in ways they have
not yet imagined.
Further research on these lawyer organizations, other lawyer
organizations in the countries (where applicable), and how they operate in
their political environment is needed. Case studies of lawyer organizations
in additional countries will also help us better understand when and why
lawyer organizations act (or do not act) to influence the law. Moreover, the
account of lawmaking efforts by lawyer organizations reported here
suggests other important questions for research. How do lawyer
organizations seek to influence law? As lawyers, do they tend toward
strategies not typically used by other organizations because of their access
to judges and government officials, or do they act like other organizations
with respect to lobbying? How does a country's history affect its lawyer
organizations vis-d-vis attempts to influence the law? In which countries
have the global influences on lawyer organizations been most (and least)
pronounced, and why? And the obvious next question: how successful are
lawyer organizations in their efforts to influence law?
Lawyer organizations operated as guilds centuries ago to protect their
livelihoods and increase their power. Describing (and decrying) bar
insistence on self-regulation and mandatory membership in the United
States, J.A.C. Grant observed, "the guild has returned. Its purposes are the
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same as in the Middle Ages." Today we still see substantial effort
devoted to protecting lawyers' independence, status, and monopoly on
legal services. Yet, there are also numerous examples of lawyer
organizations acting to defend the courts, improve the administration of
justice, and secure access to justice. Significant efforts have also been
made by lawyer organizations in some countries to advance human rights
and improve civil society, though these are less common. Under what
circumstances will lawyer organizations act to influence the law beyond
the guild's interests? This study begins to answer that question.

473 J.A.C. Grant, The Gild Returns to America, 4 J. POLITICS 303, 316 (1942).

